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Probabilistic Compliance
Alex Raskolnikovt
Uncertain legal standards are pervasive but understudied The key
theoreticalresult showing an ambiguous relationshipbetween legal uncertainty
and optimal deterrence remains largely undeveloped, and no alternative
conceptual approaches to the economic analysis of legal uncertainty have
emerged This Article offers such an alternative by shifting from the wellestablished and familiar optimal deterrence theory to the new and unfamiliar
probabilisticcomplianceframework. This shift brings the analysis closer to the
world of legal practice and yields new theoretical insights. Most importantly,
lower uncertainty tends to lead to more compliantpositions and greaterprivate
gains. In contrast, the marketfor legal advice tends to reduce compliance over
time-a trend that a regulator may counter either by clarifying the law or by
reiterating the law's continuing ambiguity. If detection is uncertain, the
probabilistic compliance framework reveals why, contrary to the prevailing
view, the standard damages multiplier should be used to counter detection
uncertainty but not legal uncertainty. The Article also reconciles economists'
and lawyers' understanding of probabilities, highlights the challenges of
modeling risk-bearing costs resulting from uncertain legal commands, and
provides theoretical support for gain-based sanctions beyond the limited
settings where the complete deterrence theory hasjustified their use thus far.
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Introduction
Economic analysis of legal uncertainty has seen little progress in three
decades. The breakthrough contributions in the 1980s produced interesting but
ambiguous results while relying on strong assumptions. 2 In the following years,
scholars have had little success in relaxing the assumptions or in resolving,
limiting, or otherwise illuminating the ambiguity. 3 Not surprisingly, legal
uncertainty has faded into the background of law and economics scholarship.
In sharp contrast, it has remained of great importance in the world of legal
practice. Disagreements about the appropriate level of the law's certainty are
pervasive. They embroil courts and administrative agencies, domestic and
international actors. And they have major policy implications.
Examples are easy to find. The United States, for instance, is the only
developed nation resisting the adoption of the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) because the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
prefers the more certain Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) to
the less certain IFRS. 4 Regulation of financial derivatives, to take another
1.
See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 93-97 (1987);
John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards,
70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984); Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal
Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986).
2.
3.

For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
A rare exception is Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Errors and the Functioning of Tort

Liability, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 165 (2005). His findings are discussed below. See infra note 21.
4.

See Martin Gelter & Zebra G. Kavame Eroglu,

Dynamics ofResistance Against IFRS, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 89, 105 (2014).
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example, continues to suffer because one principal regulator, the SEC, prefers a
more certain, rules-based approach while another one, the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), favors a less certain, principles-based
strategy.5 The United States Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit cannot agree on how certain the patent law should be. The
highest court insists on vague formulations while the specialized circuit court
prefers clear rules. 6
Even the tax law-the domain often perceived as dominated by bright-line
rules-is infused with tension resulting from legal uncertainty. For instance, it
took the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Treasury Department ten years
and three tries to interpret a key uncertain term related to controversial
corporate inversion transactions. 7 These involve U.S. corporations moving
offshore, often to reduce their U.S. tax bills. Congress enacted a punitive tax
regime for inverting companies, but withheld its wrath if the inverter has
"substantial business activities" in its new corporate home. The regulators first
interpreted the term "substantial" with a multi-factor test stapled to a safe
harbor and illustrated by clarifying examples. 9 They then moved to a multifactor test with no explanations of any kind.' 0 Finally, they abandoned the
11
multi-factor test altogether in favor of a clear rule. This story is hardly
.12
unique.
Legal uncertainty is not only pervasive, it is persistent. Numerous
uncertain terms remain undefined for years, even decades. 13 Legislators,
administrative agencies, and courts infuse the law with new vague standards all

5.

See Frank D'Souza et al., Illuminating the Need for Regulation in Dark Markets:

Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 473, 500-01 (2010);
Financial Regulatory Reform, A New Foundation: Rebuilding FinancialSupervision and Regulation,
U.S. DEP'T TREASURY 50 (2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf
See David Olson & Stefania Fusco, Rules Versus Standards: CompetingNotions of
6.
Inconsistency Robustness in Patent Law, 64 ALA. L REV. 647, 664, 668-77 (2013).
Congress added section 7874, containing the uncertain term in question, in 2004.
7.

See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 801, 118 Stat. 1418, 1562-66 (2004).
The final regulations interpreting this term were issued in 2015. See T.D. 9720, 2015-25 I.R.B. 1070.
1.R.C. § 7874(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2012).
8.
For a summary, see Joseph A. Tootle, The Regulation of Corporate Inversions and
9.
"SubstantialBusiness Activities," 33 VA. TAX REV. 353, 378-79 (2013).

10.
11.

See id. at 379-81.
See id. at 384-85; Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3(b) (interpreting the "substantial business

activities" test to mean 25% of the employees, employee compensation, assets, and income of the
consolidated group of companies).
For a similarly tortured history of the Treasury regulations interpreting the term
12.

"substantially similar" in I.R.C. § 871(m), see David S. Miller & Jason Schwartz, New 871(m)
Regulations Finalize Dividend-Equivalent Payment Withholding Rules for Equity Derivatives, 13 J.
TAX'N FIN. PROD. 15, 15-18 (2016).
For example, an IRS official admitted in 2011 that uncertainty surrounding the
13.
term "securities" used in corporate reorganization provisions has persistent "since long before I was
born." Amy S. Elliott, ProposedDeemed Asset Sale Regs May Get Rewrite, Alexander Says, 131 TAX
NOTES 561, 562 (2011). In the same breath, the official revealed that he had no plans to resolve the
uncertainty. See id
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the time. 14 Multi-billion dollar deals go forward or fall apart based on lawyers'
varying interpretations of legally uncertain provisions. 15 Whether this
uncertainty results from incomplete information, insufficient resources,
incompetence, or some other reason,' 6 legal uncertainty is a fact of life. So, it is
important to understand its consequences.
Does greater legal certainty benefit regulators or frustrate their goals? Are
individuals and firms likely to gain from greater certainty or be harmed by it?
What are the effects of the market for legal advice-the market that is of great
importance for the most significant economic actors? What is the interaction
between legal uncertainty and detection uncertainty? The law and economics
literature has little to offer in answering these questions. This Article addresses
all of them.
Our poor understanding of the consequences of uncertain laws may appear
surprising. Legal uncertainty is a basic concept familiar to any law student, not
to mention lawyers and judges. Any time the law uses terms like "reasonable,"
"substantial," "significant," "material," or "due"-any time, that is, the law
relies on a standard rather than a rule-a rational actor taking a legally
uncertain position faces a seemingly straightforward tradeoff. The actor stands
to derive a benefit if his position is deemed compliant with the law. No bright
line separates compliance from noncompliance. The actor may change his
behavior-adjust his position-along a certain dimension to increase the
likelihood of compliance, but this adjustment is costly. The actor chooses his
position by maximizing benefits net of costs. How does legal uncertainty affect
the actor's choice?
Legal Uncertainty in the OptimalDeterrenceFramework
The path-breaking work analyzing this problem came three decades ago
from John Calfee and Richard Craswell (C&C) and, independently, from
Steven Shavell. Both C&C and Shavell evaluate the actor's response to
uncertain legal commands by comparing it to a particular reference point. For
14.
For instance, section 871(m), added to the Internal Revenue Code in 2010,
provides that some payments will be treated as "dividend equivalents" (and subject to a highly
disadvantageous tax treatment) if they are "substantially similar" to payments described in the statute.

Pub. L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010). See also T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808,
811 (2015) (holding that a city denying a siting application must provide written reasons for the denial
"essentially contemporaneously" without specifying what time period satisfies this standard); Rev. Proc.
2015-43, 2015-40 I.R.B. 467 (ruling that the size of "active business" matters for the purposes of
satisfying the spinoff provisions, but not specifying what size is acceptable).
15.
See Williams Corp., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 2016 WL 3576682 (Del.
Ch. June 24, 2016) (concluding that Latham & Watkins's refusal to deliver a "should" tax opinion was
reasonable and allowing Energy Transfer Equity L.P. to withdraw from its proposed $33 billion merger
with the Williams Companies); Alison Sider & Austen Hufford, Williams Files Appeal To Close Energy
Transfer Merger, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2016) (referring to the original value of the deal as $33 billion),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/williams-shareholders-opt-for-ete-deal- 1467036532.
16.
Answering the important question about the causes and persistence of legal
uncertainty is not this Article's objective.
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C&C, this point is the socially optimal level of behavior; for Shavell, it is an
exogenous level of care (which is determined with the goal of maximizing
welfare or, under some assumptions, efficiency).1 7 These reference points are
crucial to the analysis. If behavior falls short of the optimal level-say drivers
exceed the efficiency-maximizing speed-uncertainty results in costly underdeterrence. If behavior surpasses the optimum, the problem is over-deterrence.
Either way, the inquiry aims to understand how varying the vagueness of a
speed limit changes the efficiency of the drivers' behavior.
This optimal deterrence framework is fruitful if we may plausibly estimate
the optimal level of behavior. Perhaps we may do so when it comes to
speeding. 8 But what about the "substantial business activities" test for
corporate inversions? Here, we encounter a very challenging problem. Not only
is there no theory of optimal corporate reorganizations, there is no theory of
optimal corporate tax. Even the theory of optimal capital income taxation (with
corporate tax being one form of it) is not well developed.19 So we have no way
of deciding what level of business activity in the inverter's new home country
is optimal if the goal is to maximize efficiency or welfare. The optimal
deterrence theory sheds little light on how best to interpret-or enforce-the
"substantial business activities" test or many similar vague thresholds found
throughout the Internal Revenue Code. Moreover, tax is not unique. Many
(most?) other real-life regulatory regimes do not come close to efficiency
maximization.20 In all those regimes, the optimal deterrence theory has very
limited applications.
The gap between the optimal laws and the real ones limits the policy
relevance of C&C's and Shavell's foundational results. C&C's key conclusion
that legal uncertainty creates conflicting incentives for over- and under-

See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97. While Shavell's discussion of legal uncertainty
17.
does not focus on whether this exogenous level is socially optimal, most of the rest of the book does
precisely that. See id. at 7. Thus, his analysis of legal uncertainty adopts the optimal deterrence
framework implicitly. Efficiency maximization does not take distributional consequences into account,
while welfare maximization does. If one accepts the argument, or simply assumes, that all distributional
issues should be addressed by the tax-and-transfer system, one would conclude that legal rules should be
designed without accounting for distributional consequences. In that case, efficiency-maximizing legal
rules will be welfare-maximizing as well. See, e.g., David Weisbach, Distributionally Weighted CostBenefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets OrganizationalReform, 7 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 151, 151-52

(2015).
One may imagine that a negligence standard at least roughly maximizes
18.
efficiency, or perhaps one could have imagined this in the early days of law and economics. Richard
Craswell's more recent views about the social optimality of law are much more ambivalent. See Richard
Craswell, In That Case, What Is the Question? Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112

YALE L.J. 903, 911 (2003).
19.

For an extended discussion, see Alex Raskolnikov, Accepting the Limits of Tax

Law and Economics, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 523, 560-66 (2013).
For an argument that the common law is unlikely to produce efficiency20.
maximizing rules, see Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution ofa Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
330 (2010). For an expression of similar skepticism about contract law, see Eric A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of ContractLaw After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 830 (2003);
Craswell, supra note 18.
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deterrence relative to the social optimum is not helpful if we do not know
where the social optimum lies. Their conclusion that uncertainty leads to
ambiguous predictions of behavior-with actors both exceeding and falling
short of the social optimum-is uninformative for the same reason. Shavell's
similar conclusion with respect to the level of due care is likewise unhelpful if
we have no idea what that level is. Thus, not only are the key results reached by
C&C and Shavell ambiguous, they are difficult to interpret without the social
optimality assumption or the exogenously given level of behavior.21
Legal Uncertainty in the ProbabilisticCompliance Framework
This Article offers a new take on legal uncertainty by focusing on
compliance rather than deterrence. Scholars working in the optimal deterrence
tradition use the terms deterrence and compliance interchangeably.22 This
Article draws a sharp distinction between the two. It uses the term deterrence to
refer to the goal of assuring that an agent's behavior maximizes social
welfare. 23 In contrast, it uses the term compliance as a legal rather than
economic concept. By compliance, this Article simply means compliance with
the law, without making any assumptions about the law's welfare
characteristics. When the law is uncertain, greater compliance means a higher
likelihood that one's position will be viewed as lawful by the relevant
authority-a higher probability of success. Compliance with uncertain law,
therefore, is necessarily probabilistic.
This change in focus offers greater clarity as a positive matter but greater
ambiguity as a normative one. On the descriptive side, the Article's first
notable result is that the famous ambiguity in the relationship between legal
uncertainty and optimal deterrence discovered by C&C and Shavell largely
disappears when we focus on the interaction between uncertainty and
compliance. While greater certainty may lead to either over- or underdeterrence, it generally leads to greater compliance. This conclusion follows
from the simulations based on this Article's model. It also follows from C&C's
original simulations that I replicate. And it holds if a normal distribution
(generally used in C&C's and this Article's simulations) is replaced by several
other plausible probability distributions. To be sure, simulations do not amount

&

21.
Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 3, extends C&C's analysis but finds the same or even
greater indeterminacy in the relationship between uncertainty and deterrence. A few extensions that
eliminate this indeterminacy (Dari-Mattiacci's Propositions 12 and 15) model situations that lack the
key feature of the regulatory model offered here and the tort model mostly focused on by Craswell

Calfee-the discontinuous jump in actor's payoff upon a finding of liability. See id. at 179-83.
22.
Consider, for example, the titles of the two C&C articles on legal uncertainty. See
Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1; Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1.
23.
This is a standard use of the term "optimal deterrence." See, e.g., Amitai Aviram,

Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 742 (2012).
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to a rigorous proof.24 But the conclusion that greater certainty leads to greater
compliance is robust.
This conclusion is reinforced when one considers the likely effects of the
market for legal advice. The Article suggests two effects. First, as lawyers
grapple with each new uncertain legal test, they often converge to a common
interpretation even when the government issues no guidance. In this model's
terms, this convergence means a decrease in the perceived uncertainty while the
actual uncertainty (the content of the legal standard) remains unchanged.
Second, clients pressure their counsel to condone progressively lower
compliance efforts as sufficient to fulfill an uncertain legal command. This
pressure is entirely rational: lower compliance efforts are less costly. But it
leads to a one-way ratchet in the absence of government intervention: lawyers
interpret uncertain standards as being increasingly forgiving. Both effects yield
the same result. Over time, clients take increasingly aggressive, less plausible,
less likely to succeed positions.
Another result is that greater certainty typically leads to larger private
gains. This would not surprise anyone familiar with the unrelenting efforts by
sophisticated firms (that may be plausibly assumed to be risk-neutral 25) to
induce regulators to clarify uncertain standards. The model also predicts that
when rational actors take uncertain legal positions that are observed by the
regulator, their positions are very likely to have more than a fifty-fifty chance
of success. This, too, would not surprise legal practitioners involved in the
opinion practice in connection with public deals.
A further descriptive contribution made here is to reconcile a lawyer's
understanding of uncertainty with that of an economist. The two have different
origins and result from different mental processes, but they produce the same
relationship between the probability of success and the actor's effort to comply
with the law. Thus, the widespread use of the language of probability theory by
legal advisors is not only sensible, but is consistent with the economic models
relying on that theory to investigate legal uncertainty.
Implications of the ProbabilisticCompliance Framework
What should we make of these results? This is when the departure from
the optimal deterrence framework becomes an issue. The welfare maximization
objective may be unrealistically ambitious, but it is clear, rigorous, and has a
significant normative appeal. Without it, how should we evaluate the effects of
legal uncertainty just described?

Shavell's results are based on comparative statics rather than simulations, but his
24.
approach has other limitations. See infra text accompanying note 119.
25.
These are multi-national corporations. See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna,

Corporate Crime Legislation: A PoliticalEconomy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 123 (2004) ("The
corporation is normally assumed to be risk-neutral because shareholders can diversify their investment
in the corporation . . . .").
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One possibility is to posit that law should facilitate compliance.
Unfortunately, compliance is a fuzzy objective if law is uncertain. The problem
is not that compliance has no clear economic interpretation-the degree of
compliance is simply the probability of success. The fuzziness comes from
specifying what this probability ought to be. Without insisting on any particular
answer, this Article makes four observations.
First, regulators of all stripes generally prefer positions that are more
likely to be legal to those less likely to be so. 26 Second, while law enforcers
want more compliance, they do not ask for certain compliance-they accept
probabilistic compliance without demanding perfection. 27 Third, the law
sometimes expressly conditions a favorable outcome on the probability of
success exceeding 50%.28 And fourth, scholars have argued that compliance
with uncertain standards should be understood as behavior that is more likely to
be legal than illegal.29 If one finds these arguments appealing, one would be
interested in this Article's insights about the effect of legal uncertainty on
compliance.
Another approach is to posit that, if we take the law as given and
irreducibly uncertain, it makes sense to maximize private gains of the regulated
parties, at least when their behavior is observed by enforcement authorities. If
externalities and other market failures are unlikely, or if the social welfare
effects of externalities are ambiguous, 30 this may be a plausible evaluative
'

criterion. 3

This Article does not defend either the compliance or the gain
maximization as normatively appropriate. But for those who find compliance or
private benefits to be appealing, or policy-relevant, or just intellectually
interesting considerations, this Article's takeaway is that greater legal certainty
tends to increase both.
Thus, whether it is the SEC defining the term "control" in terms of
specific percentages or a vague standard, 32 or the IRS making a similar decision
about the term "substantial," 33 or the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) choosing whether to require companies to book a reserve when outlays

26.
27.
28.
29.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying notes 111-114.
infra text accompanying notes 148-149.
infra text accompanying notes 115-117.
Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 111,

154-55 (2009); Rachelle Holmes, The Tax Lawyer as Gatekeeper, 49 U. Lou. L. REV. 185, 212 (2010).
30.
This will be the case if a regulated activity produces an externality (or something
similar to it) but the regulation itself is welfare-reducing. For a discussion, see Raskolnikov, supra note

19, at 574.
31.

For scholarship using this normative criterion, see infra text accompanying notes

142-143.
32.
See, e.g., Gelter & Eroglu, supra note 4, at 116-19 (examining various degrees of
specificity of defining "control").
33.
See supra text accompanying notes 7-12.
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)

34
are "probable" or to specify this term more precisely, or the Department of
Justice (DOJ) considering jointly with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
whether to define relevant markets by referring to "effective competition" or by
using numerical thresholds,3 5 the regulators should be aware that greater legal
uncertainty is often detrimental both to private actors and to compliance with
the law.
Some evidence suggests that regulators misunderstand these
36
relationships. At the same time, there are encouraging examples of regulators
responding appropriately to the negative (from the compliance perspective)
37
consequences of the market for legal advice.
The Article also illuminates the interaction between legal uncertainty and
detection uncertainty. C&C investigate the use of the standard damages
multiplier in the optimal deterrence setting, assuming that the multiplier is used
to reverse both types of uncertainty.3 8 This Article explains that if policymakers
are interested in compliance rather than deterrence, the multiplier should offset
detection uncertainty alone. This conclusion is new to the literature, and it has a
clear rationale.
Using a multiplier to offset legal uncertainty in the optimal deterrence
39
framework converts, in expectation, a threshold regime (such as negligence
into a strict liability regime. As is well known, both may be welfaremaximizing. 40 Thus, there is no need to fine-tune the use of the multiplier to
separate legal and detection uncertainty. In the compliance framework,
however, using a multiplier to offset legal uncertainty converts an uncertain
legal standard into an outright prohibition. That is because the stronger the
position one takes, the greater one's likelihood of success, the smaller the
chance of liability, and the larger the multiplier. No rational policymaker would
endorse this result because if the policymaker had 'preferred an outright
prohibition, it would have enacted a clear rule in the first place. Thus, when the

34.

See Jennifer L. Blouin et al., Pre-Empting Disclosure? Firms' Decisions Prior to

FIN No. 48, 85 ACCT. REV. 791, 794 (2010) (explaining the switch from the general "probable" standard
for booking tax reserves to the 50% threshold).
See Richard J. Wegener et al., Nonprice Vertical Restraints Tying, Bundling,
35.
Rebates & Loyalty Discounts-ConsumerFriendly or Exclusionary Conduct?, 56 ALI-CLE 41, 142-46
(2012) (describing the "small but significant nontransitory increase in price" standard adopted by the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines as the "most analytically rigorous approach" to defining relevant
markets).
See infra text accompanying notes 153-155.
36.
See infra text accompanying notes 173-177.
37.
See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292-93 (assuming that the standard
38.
multiplier is the inverse of the probability of punishment, which reflects both detection and legal
uncertainty).
For a suggestion that the term "threshold regime" is more appealing than "fault39.
based" regime, see Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms, and

the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1142 (2014).
See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public
40.
Enfbrcement of Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND EcONOMIcs 403 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven

Shavell eds., 2007).

499

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 34, 2017

law is not optimal, the multiplier should account for detection uncertainty
alone.
These are the Article's main results. Along with additional findings, they
are presented in three parts. Part I offers the basic model, locates it in the
literature, reconciles the meaning of probability statements by lawyers and
economists, and offers compliance (probability of success) as the evaluative
criterion for studying uncertain standards that may not be plausibly assumed to
maximize efficiency or welfare. Part II presents the main results regarding the
relationship between uncertainty on the one hand and compliance and private
gains on the other. It discusses the effects of the market for legal advice, the
design of the damages multiplier, and the use of probabilistic compliance as a
plausible regulatory objective. Part III briefly explores complications arising
from multi-dimensional legal standards, variable benefit functions, and costs
that change abruptly upon a slight shift in the actor's position. It also identifies
the unappreciated challenges of investigating the effects of legal uncertainty on
risk-averse actors. Part IV explains why the Article's findings extend the
analysis of gain-based sanctions for violations of non-optimal laws beyond the
narrow set of cases traditionally considered by theorists of complete (rather
than optimal) deterrence. A brief conclusion follows.
I. The Groundwork
Uncertain legal commands are the stuff of everyday life. Lawmakers enact
them, lawyers interpret them, and people make decisions guided by them.41 Yet
there has been surprisingly little investigation of the basic questions related to
legal uncertainty, at least in the law and economics literature.
What do lawyers convey when they express various degrees of confidence
in a given position? How do courts and lawmakers evaluate compliance with
uncertain legal standards? What does it mean to "comply" with a vague legal
command in the first place? This Part starts with a simple model and lays the
groundwork for its analysis by offering answers to these and related questions.
A. Motivating Examples
To motivate the inquiry, consider a few simple vignettes. Imagine a major
U.S. company wishing to sell one of its two businesses to a potential acquirer.
If the sale can be structured as a tax-free transaction, the company will realize a
benefit of $100 million. If, however, the sale is taxable, the tax liability will
erase the benefit entirely, and the sale is not worth pursuing. Tax lawyers
inform the company's CEO that in order to qualify for the tax-free treatment,
the company must transfer "substantially all" of its assets to the acquirer.42

500

41.

See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.

42.

I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2012).
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Moreover, the lawyers explain that the meaning of "substantially all" is
uncertain. Transferring no assets clearly fails the test, while transferring all
assets definitely satisfies it. For anything in between, the greater the percentage
of the assets transferred, the more confident the lawyers are that the test is met.
Unfortunately, transferring assets in excess of a certain amount is undesirable
for the company, and the greater the excess, the less happy the company's
CEO.
Similar scenarios may be constructed in almost any area of the law.
Imagine a corporate board contemplating a potentially profitable transaction
that is expected to raise the company value by $100 million. The board must
decide how much independent advice it should obtain to protect the transaction
from a challenge under the demanding-but vague-"entire fairness" test of
the Delaware corporate law.43 There are plenty of friendly bankers standing
ready to provide the "fairness opinions" that the board needs, but the bankers
charge hefty fees for those opinions. The more opinions the board receives, the
greater the cost to the company, but the greater the likelihood that the court will
uphold the transaction against a future challenge.
Or take an administrative agency considering a new regulation that is
expected to produce, in the agency's view, a $100 million benefit. The agency
must decide how much of its limited resources to spend on the cost-benefit
analysis in order to protect the regulation from being invalidated by a court.4
The agency has no doubt that the new regulation will turn out to be beneficial
no matter how much cost-benefit analysis the agency undertakes. But the
analysis is expensive. On the other hand, the more the agency spends, the more
thorough the analysis, and the greater the chance of a judicial approval.
Even legislative decision-making can be modeled in the same way.
Imagine Congress finalizing a piece of legislation expected to produce $100
million of (what legislators view as) a surplus. The legislature must decide how
much "due process" the legislation should provide to its beneficiaries in order
to withstand a constitutional challenge. 45 Importantly, greater procedural
protections (such as multiple hearings) do not change the surplus but impose a
greater cost on the government. Greater protections also increase the likelihood
that a constitutional challenge will fail. Other examples may be easily offered,
all similar in the key respects discussed next.
B. The Model and Its Context
All of the vignettes just described have important common features. Each
vignette involves a rational actor who may be assumed to be risk-neutral. The
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (explaining the
43.
"entire fairness" test).
See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down SEC
44.
regulation for insufficient substantiation).
See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
45.
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actor would like to obtain a benefit b, but faces uncertainty regarding the
benefit's availability under the law. The actor chooses his position under an
uncertain legal standard by choosing the variable x. This variable may reflect a
percentage (of assets, economic exposure, market share, risk of loss, and the
like), a time period (sometimes measured in days, other times in years), a
number (of fairness opinions, expert cost-benefit reports, administrative
hearings, and so on), or some other dimension. Various values of x (that I will
also call the actor's positions or compliance efforts) correspond to various
probabilities of success on review. Assume that a greater compliance effort
corresponds to a higher probability of success-that is, to a more compliant,
stronger, more conservative legal position.46 Achieving higher values of x
comes with a greater cost, however. That is, stronger positions are costlier than
weaker ones for private actors.
A few other features are common to all the vignettes. The uncertainty
surrounding the availability of the benefit may not be resolved ex ante, such as
by acquiring legal advice. After the actor chooses his position x, some authority
will scrutinize it and either allow the benefit by finding the position to be
compliant or deny it by finding the position to be non-compliant. That is,
detection and scrutiny are assured. Finally, and provisionally, assume that
violators of uncertain legal commands face no sanctions; they only lose the
benefit b.47
How does the actor choose x? He does so by assessing the costs and
benefits of taking positions of varying strength. Assume that the cost depends
on x in some yet unspecified way, so C(x) is the actor's cost function. The actor
who chooses any particular x incurs the cost C(x) with certainty. In contrast, the
receipt of the benefit b is not guaranteed. Moreover, the actor can influence the
likelihood of securing that benefit. Specifically, the probability of success
depends on the compliance effort, x. Thus, the probability of success is not just
a number-it is a function of x that we will call F(x). A rational actor will
maximize his expected gain, G(x), which is the net gain from exerting the
compliance effort x in order to obtain the benefit b with probability F(x) while
incurring the cost C(x). 48
Having specified the key features of the model, we can now locate it in
the literature. The optimization problem offered here is very similar to the one

46.
Nothing of interest would change if we made the opposite assumption. As the later
discussion explains, the statement in the text is always true if we hold the level of uncertainty fixed, but
not otherwise. See infra text accompanying note 160.
47.
This is a very realistic assumption for many standards and a substantial range of x
values. For example, many tax positions that lose in court (that is, that lead the taxpayer to lose the tax
benefit) are not subject to penalties even if the positions were worse than a fifty-fifty bet to begin with.
See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012) (stating that understatement of income tax does not lead to
penalties if it results from a position having substantial authority). Similarly, the remedy of

disgorgement is a quintessential example of the loss of b. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012) (requiring
the disgorgement of short-swing profits by corporate insiders).
48.
Formally, the actor's expected gain is thus: G(x) = bF(x) - C(x).
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explored by C&C and Shavell. 49 C&C posit an actor such as a driver choosing
how fast to drive under an uncertain negligence standard. The actor compares a
higher certain benefit of greater speed against a higher uncertain cost of
accidents for which the driver may be found liable.50 In contrast with the
present setup, their model has variable (rather than fixed) benefits and
uncertainty that relates to losses (rather than gains). Still, the two models have
much in common, so it is important to be clear about the differences.
Most essentially, the evaluative framework offered here differs from
C&C's in key respects. C&C assume that, although the law is uncertain, it is
either socially optimal or it may be made so. They posit that there is a specific
value of x (I will call it xso) that corresponds to the most efficient legal regime.
Naturally, they focus on how the private actor's choice of x compares to the
socially optimal one. The closer x is to xso the better; x exceeding xSO means
under-deterrence (think of driving too fast) while x falling short of xs means
over-deterrence. C&C famously conclude that legal uncertainty yields
incentives leading to both under- and over-deterrence with an optimal legal
standard and that both phenomena arise in their simulations. Shavell reaches a
similar result without relying on simulations by modeling legal uncertainty as
an error in determination of an exogenously given (though not necessarily
optimal) level of due care.
As discussed in the Introduction, the social optimality assumption is
difficult to maintain in many legal regimes. We are unlikely to know-possibly
in theory, and certainly in practice-the welfare-maximizing amount of assets
to be transferred in a tax-free spinoff, or the socially optimal number of fairness
opinions, or the welfare-maximizing delay in issuing a written explanation for
denying a government permit.52 A further difficulty arises because in any
regulatory regime that involves transfers (taxation being an obvious example),
the key result characterizing the social optimum-the result on which the
53
optimal deterrence theory and C&C's analysis heavily rely-does not hold. If
we drop the social optimality assumption, C&C's formal analysis no longer
54
applies and their evaluative criterion is no longer available. Shavell does not

This Article refers primarily to C&C's analysis because it is more informative for
49.
the reasons discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 119. 1 discuss Shavell's work where its
findings or implications differ from those of C&C.

Thus, C&C's optimization problem is G(x) = B(x) - C(x)F(x). See Craswell

&

50.

Calfee, supra note 1, at 281.
See SHAVELL, supra note 1.
51.

52.

See T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015) (introducing

the "essentially contemporaneous" standard for evaluating the timing of a written explanation for a
permit denial).
If, for instance, the cost imposed on the private actor by a legal regime is a
53.
transfer, it is no longer true that the social optimum corresponds to the point where the marginal private
cost is equal to the marginal private benefit, as is true for regimes intended to force private actors to
internalize externalities.
The formal analysis does not apply because in the absence of the social optimality
54.
assumption, it is impossible to derive C&C's first-order condition by taking advantage of the fact that at
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rely on the social optimality of the standard of care for his analysis of
uncertainty, but he takes this standard as a given. In contrast, when lawyers
consider an uncertain legal test such as "substantial business activity" or
"substantially all," no particular number is available as an obvious reference
point.5 5

This Article offers a new interpretation of the model by shifting the focus
from optimal deterrence to probabilistic compliance. This shift yields new
results about the interaction between uncertainty and compliance, the effect of
uncertainty on private gains, and the interplay between legal and detection
uncertainty, to name a few. Notably, some of the findings arise not only from
the present model, but from replicating and reinterpreting C&C's original
simulations as well.
C&C's work has not been the only inquiry into the efficiency properties of
uncertain law. Similar to this Article (and in contrast with C&C), these other
contributions do not assume the existence of socially optimal legal rules.
However, the uncertainty they investigate differs from the one studied here
(and by C&C and Shavell) in key respects.
Some scholars model uncertainty as arising from possible future
legislative changes. 56 Obviously, an individual actor may not adjust his choices
under current law (as the present model allows) in order to influence his
probability of success under some future yet unknown rule. Another approach
views uncertainty as the actor's lack of knowledge of legal consequences.
These models allow actors to reduce or eliminate their ignorance by learning
the rules or acquiring advice. 57 In contrast, the legal uncertainty studied here is
irreducible. In fact, acquiring advice may increase it.58
Several authors model tax law uncertainty as a random variation of
taxable income around the mean. Some of these models do not allow the actor
to vary the outcome by choosing different values of x-the key feature of the

the social optimum the marginal extemal harm is equal to the marginal private benefit. The evaluative
criterion is unavailable because xs is unknowable.
55.
For a suggestion on such a number, see infra text accompanying notes 103-104;
for discussions of the weakness of this suggestion, see infra the concluding paragraphs of Sections I.E

and II.D.
56.

See James Alm, Uncertain Tax Policies, Individual Behavior, and Welfare, 78

AM. ECON. REV. 237, 237, 241 (1988).
57.
See Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J.
ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 13-14 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Accuracy, Complexity, and the Income Tax, 14

J.L. ECON. & ORG. 61, 74-75, 78 (1998); Kate Krause, Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity?, 28
PUB. FIN. REV. 395, 399 (2000); Suzanne Scotchmer, Who Profitsfrom Taxpayer Confusion?, 29 ECON.
LET. 49, 49-50 (1989). Some of the contributions expressly set aside the investigation of "arguability"
(that is, the likelihood of success of a particular position in light of legal uncertainty). Scotchmer, supra,
at 51.
58.
See BORIS 1. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 22.6.3 (2005) (discussing the controversy regarding the "principal place of
business" term that preceded and followed the Supreme Court's Soliman decision).
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present model. 59 Others are tax-specific. They incorporate uncertainty into the
optimal tax theory or rely on unique features of the tax law.60
A few investigations come closer to the present one in interpreting legal
uncertainty, but they lack at least one of the key features of the proposed
model. David Ulph investigates taxpayers who face uncertain legal commands
(in the sense discussed here) and purchase tax schemes of various
aggressiveness. 6 ' However, one of his model's main drivers-the risk of
retroactive legislation-is not a serious concern in most legal settings.62 Paul
Beck and co-authors study legal uncertainty and variation in tax reporting
aggressiveness.63 Kate Krause models a parameter that may be interpreted as
the strength of one's legal position as well.64 Lillian Mills and co-authors
65
present a model where taxpayers may take positions of varying strength. And
Michael Graetz and co-authors investigate the effect of tax advice on decisions
of taxpayers facing different probabilities that their deductions would be
disallowed (which the authors call "exposure").66 None of these models treat
the actor's compliance effort x as an endogenous variable. In contrast, the
fundamental question that the current model investigates is how a rational actor
facing uncertain law chooses his compliance effort.67
Economic models featuring an endogenous parameter similar to this
model's x do exist. Although they do not interpret x as the compliance effort,
this does not necessarily make them inapplicable. Shlomo Yitzhaki considers

&

See Woon-Oh Jung, Tax Reporting Game Under Uncertain Tax Laws and
59.
Asymmetric Information, 37 ECON. LET. 323, 323-24 (1991) (positing that "a taxpayer does not know
her true taxable income due to tax law complexity, [but] she is assumed to be privately informed of its
distribution").
60.
See Kaplow, supra note 57, at 69 (connecting his analysis of taxable income
uncertainty to the optimal tax theory and recognizing the resulting complexity); Suzanne Scotchmer
Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 17, 19 (1989) (basing the model on
the fact that tax understatements are subject to penalties but tax overstatements are not rewarded by the
government).
Ulph uses the term "legal effectiveness" rather than aggressiveness. See David
61.
Ulph, Avoidance Policies-A New ConceptualFramework 1, 7 (Oxford Univ., Ctr. for Bus. Taxation

Working Paper No. 09/22, 2009).
62.
See id at 8-20. For a discussion of this and other limitations of Ulph's analysis, as
well as a discussion of other scholars' contributions mentioned in this paragraph, see Alex Raskolnikov,
Six Degrees of Graduation:Law and Economics of Variable Sanctions, 43 FLA. ST. L. REV. 1015, 1027-

28(2016).
63.
See, e.g., Paul J. Beck et al., Taxpayer Disclosure and Penalty Laws, 2 J. PUB.
EcoN. THEORY 243 (2000).
64.
See Krause, supra note 57, at 400.

65.
1726-27 (2010).

See Lillian F. Mills et al., FIN 48 and Tax Compliance, 85 ACCT. REv. 1721,

See Michael J. Graetz et al., Expert Opinions and Taxpayer Compliance: A
66.
StrategicAnalysis 5 (Cal. Inst. of Tech. Soc. Sci. Working Paper No. 710, 1989).
Mark Cronshaw and James Alm offer a model that includes a parameter (a),
67.
defined as "the probability that a high-income taxpayer reports low (i.e., the probability of
noncompliance or cheating)." Mark B. Cronshaw & James Alm, Tax Compliance with Two-Sided
Uncertainty, 23 PUB. FIN. Q. 139, 144 (1995). Importantly, the taxpayer in the model is free to choose
the value of a, making it endogenous. It is unclear, however, what this probability corresponds to in real
life-that is, how a taxpayer may choose this probability.
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the probability of detection that depends on the amount of evaded income
chosen by the taxpayer.68 Louis Kaplow studies the probability of detection that
varies with the taxpayers' expenditures on concealing their evasion.69 However,
neither model links the endogenous choice of x to a probability distribution of
the kind considered here. 70 Therefore, neither model sheds light on how this
distribution affects the choice of x-the central question of this Article.
Overall, the decades-old contributions by C&C and Shavell remain the
leading economic inquiries into rational decision-making under uncertain legal
commands.71 Therefore, this Article uses their findings as reference points.
C. The Meaning ofProbabilities
The basic model presented in the previous section has only three
variables. Two of the three require little elaboration. The benefit b is assumed
to be fixed, and the cost C(x) reflects the cost of compliance, whatever it may
be. The meaning and shape of the probability distribution F(x), however, is far
from obvious.
C&C spend little time on investigating the source of the distributions they
use and the meaning of probability statements they make. In their first article,
they introduce three bell-shaped curves as "three possible distributions of
probabilities" 72 without further elaboration. In their later, more formal piece
they assume a "probability density function associated with the uncertain legal
standard." 73 Shavell says even less about the probability distribution he
studies.74 These generic specifications are standard and uncontroversial for
legal economists. But they have perplexed or troubled lawyers and academics

68.

See Shlomo Yitzhaki, On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion, 15 PUB. FIN.

127 (1987).

Q.

123,

69.
See Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion, 43 J.
PUB. ECON. 221, 230 (1990).

70.

Neither Yitzhaki nor Kaplow discuss the likely shape of the probability

distribution, and there appears to be no reason to assume that the relationship between the probability of
detection and either the amount of evaded income (in Yitzhaki) or the concealment efforts (in Kaplow)
has the shape that is posited here; nor is either distribution bounded like the present one. In fact, it
appears plausible to assume that increasing the endogenous parameter (the amount evaded or the
concealment effort) yields diminishing marginal returns, producing a concave density function in
contrast with an S-shaped one discussed in the next section.
71.
For recent work relying on C&C's analysis of legal uncertainty with an implicit
assumption that this analysis reflects our best understanding of the subject, see Daniel Shaviro,
Disclosure and Civil Penalty Rules in the U.S. Legal Response to Corporate Tax Shelters, in TAX AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 229, 241 (Wolfgang Schdn ed., 2008); Sven Hoeppner & Laura Lyhs,
Behavior Under Vague Standards: Evidence from the Laboratory (JENA Economic Research Paper

#2016-010).
72.
73.
74.
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Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 971
Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 281 n.6.
For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 105-106.
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interested in legal uncertainty as it actually exists.75 Therefore, we take up the
task of demystifying F(x).
Thus far, we have only said that F(x) reflects the uncontroversial
assumption that the probability of success depends on the compliance effort.
The more assets the corporation transfers, the more likely it is to meet the
"substantially all" tax standard. The more fairness opinions the board of
directors obtains, the more likely it is to satisfy the "entire fairness" test. What
more can be said about F(x)? And how can the answer be connected to the
basic probability theory? To address these questions, we begin by reflecting on
how legal advisors interpret uncertain standards.
To start, note that in many cases, x is bounded. In terms of the model, it
varies between 0 and 1. That is because no matter how vague the standard,
lawyers know that some compliance effort satisfies the standard for certain, and
some other level of effort flunks it just as surely. For example, lawyers may
conclude that transferring 0% (or 20%, or even 40%) of the assets definitely
flunks the "substantially all" test while transferring 100% of the assets (or 95%,
or even 90%) certainly satisfies it. Or lawyers may believe that a single fairness
opinion is certainly insufficient under the "entire fairness" test while a dozen
opinions is surely enough. To take another example, lawyers may opine that a
two-day gap definitely satisfies the "essentially contemporaneous" threshold
while a month-long delay certainly does not.76 In any of these cases, the lower
bound of x (producing certain noncompliance) corresponds to zero and the
upper bound of x (producing certain compliance) corresponds to one. To
simplify the exposition, assume that lawyers believe that the "substantially all"
standard is surely not met if a taxpayer transfers no assets at all and is surely
met if the taxpayer transfers all assets. So the [0,1] range for x corresponds to
0% to 100% of the assets.
Within the 0-to-1 (or 0% to 100% of the assets) range, lawyers' beliefs
typically have the following structure. First, a lawyer would be prepared to tell
the client what he views as the best interpretation of the "substantially all"
standard or any other standard if he had to pick a single number. To make the
matter more concrete, let us assume that this number is 0.6 (or 60% of the
assets). Moreover, the legal advisor would typically explain that there is a
relatively small range of percentage values that likely describes the uncertain
standard in question. Let us say that this range is between 0.5 and 0.7. Finally,
the lawyer would say that he is almost certain that the share of assets that
constitutes "substantially all" is between 0.4 and 0.8.
These views mean that the relationship between the compliance effort x
(here, the percentage of assets transferred) and the probability of success F(x) is
75.

See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U.

PA. L. REV. 1017, 1022-23 (2009) (arguing that with a few exceptions, "legal scholarship has not
focused on the question of what probability statements mean" and that adopting a particular meaning of
probability statements "may reverse other legal scholars' results").

76.

T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015).
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not linear. The probability of success remains very close to zero for a range of
low values of x, and it is very close to 100% for a range of high values of x. In
some middle region, however, the probability of success increases relatively
fast. In the current example, this region is between 50% and 70% of the assets
(0.5<x<0.7). Thus, the relationship between the compliance effort x and the
probability of success F(x) is S-shaped-it combines two areas of slow increase
for very weak and very strong positions and an area of fast increase in the
middle. This non-linear relationship is depicted as a dotted line in Figure 1.
The non-linearity assumption reflected in the S-shaped probability of
success curve is not based on prior literature. Rather, it reflects my experience
in interpreting and explaining legal standards as well as in giving legal
advice.77 I believe, however, that the vast majority of lawyers will view this
assumption as entirely uncontroversial in a very large number of cases. 78 The
vast majority of lawyers would also agree that, even though they often describe
the likelihood of success to their clients in probabilistic terms, they do not
interpret terms like "due" or "substantially all" by imagining a distribution of
outcomes from multiple re-litigations of the client's transaction. Instead,
lawyers generally consider the relevant authorities and exercise their judgment.
In the language of the probability theory, the probabilities that lawyers
articulate are subjectivist, not frequentist; they reflect beliefs, not lotteries.79
It is possible, however, to re-conceptualize the S-shaped curve in
frequentist terms. This would allow us to deploy the basic analytical tools of
the probability theory. Recall that lawyers believe that "substantially all" likely
means 60% of the assets; it is highly likely to fall in the 50%-70% range; and it
almost certainly lies in the 40%-80% range. These beliefs reflect legal
uncertainty-the possibility that some legal experts would draw the line at
some percentage of the assets other than sixty. We can envision a distribution
of views about the value of x expressed by hypothetical experts (regulators,

77.
Experimental psychology has developed a very similar view of how people make
uncertain judgments about probabilities. See, e.g., David Piercy, Motivated Reasoning and Verbal vs.
Numerical Probability Assessment: Evidence from an Accounting Context, 108 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330, 331-32 (2009) (discussing the "membership function"). The
discussion in the text applies to interpretations of all uncertain statements, not only probabilistic ones.
78.
In fact, the members of the Tax Forum and the Tax Club (mostly tax partners at
the leading New York firms) found the S-shaped curve to be self-evident. In the academic literature,
Mark Gergen presents a related S-shaped curve. See Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence:
CorporateTax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REv. 255, 282 (2002). Gergen's curve is essentially identical to the
one presented here, but only if we assume a constant relationship between the cost of taking a position
(Gergen's x-axis, and C(x) in the present model) and the compliance effort (the x-axis in Figure 1). This,
however, would be a highly implausible assumption. In a different article, Gergen assumes a linear
rather than an S-shaped relationship between the aggressiveness of a tax position (i.e. "probability tax is
owed") and the expected loss from an audit with automatic penalty. See Mark P. Gergen, Uncertainty
and Tax Enforcement: A Casefor Moderate Fault-BasedPenalties, 64 TAX L. REv. 453, 485 (2011).
79.
For an extended discussion of this point, see Lawsky, supra note 75. A frequentist
probability is an expectation based on a large number of objective observations, such as multiple coin
tosses. A subjectivist probability is a number reflecting the strength of a person's belief.
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judges, or legal advisors s) answering the question: "What fraction of the assets
amounts to 'substantially all' if you had to give a single number?" Answers to
this question would produce a distribution of views that may be described by a
density function f(x). Assume that the answer given most frequently would be
60%, producing the peak of the distribution. A large majority of experts would
give an answer that falls between 50% and 70%, yielding high density near the
peak. And almost everyone's answer would be somewhere between forty and
80% of the assets, meaning that the probability density outside of this range is
very low. ' Finally, everyone would agree that transferring no assets means
certain noncompliance while transferring all assets amounts to certain
compliance. Thus, the density function is bounded on a [0,1] range.
We can assume that the density function f(x) is continuous and
differentiable. 82 This function has a corresponding cumulative distribution
function F(x). Each value of F(x) is the probability that the actor would be
allowed to claim the benefit b upon choosing the compliance effort xi given the
density function f(x).84 As long as the density function has a single peak-that
is, as long as legal experts' views converge toward a particular interpretation of
an uncertain law-the distribution function has the S-shape identical to the
intuitive probability of success curve reflecting subjectivist probabilities. In
fact, the dotted line in Figure 1 reflects both the distribution function F(x) and
the subjectivist probability curve described above. Therefore, the subjectivist
and the frequentist understandings of legal uncertainty can be merged for the
purposes of the model considered here.85 The following discussion does not
distinguish between the two.
Note that both of these understandings differ from yet another meaning of
uncertainty sometimes encountered in the literature. For instance, Petro
Lisowsky and co-authors posit "a continuum from highly certain (least

Of course, the views of private lawyers and government rulemakers may
80.
diverge-a possibility considered infra Section II.E.
If these answers result from an actual large-numbers survey, the resulting
81.
probability density function is frequentist (with respect to experts' views). If, more realistically, the
answers are the product of a legal expert's imagination, the resulting distribution is subjectivist, but with
a frequentist flavor. Either way, the imaginary multiple answers allow us to construct a probability
density function that an exercise of a legal judgment cannot produce.
This is a standard assumption. See, e.g., Dari-Mattiacci, supra note 3, at 171.
82.
The density function f(x) is a derivative of the cumulative distribution function
83.

F(x). That is, F'(x) = f(x), F(x) = f f(x)dx, F(x,) = 0, and F(x,) = 1, where x, and x, are lower
and upper bounds of the range on which F(x) is defined (for our purposes, this range is [0,1]).
As x increases from 0 to 1, so does F(x). In terms of our example, transferring no
84.
assets at all (x-0) is certain to flunk the "substantially all" test (F(x)=0), while transferring all assets
(x=1) is certain to satisfy it (F(x)=l). Thus, the probability of success is non-negative and increasing in
x.
85.
This conclusion also makes it clear that the term "uncertainty" used here, by C&C,
and in much of the literature on the subject, refers to what the probability theory calls "risk" as opposed
to "ambiguity." For a discussion, see Eric Talley, On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual

Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 763-65 (2009).
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aggressive) to highly uncertain (most aggressive)" tax positions.86 Kyle Logue
discusses positions that are close to "tax evasion, where there is little
substantive legal uncertainty (i.e., the positions will almost certainly be shot
down if detected)." 87 Both of these statements focus on the uncertainty of a
particular position given ambiguous law, not on the extent to which the law
itself is uncertain. The uncertainty of a position and the uncertainty of a legal
standard are related but different. The former is endogenous while the latter is
exogenous. A regulated party has no power to clarify the uncertain legal
standard (change the shape of F(x)), but is free to eliminate all uncertainty for
itself by choosing certain compliance or something close to it.88 This Article's
focus is on the relationship between the exogenous uncertainty of legal
standards and the endogenous choice of compliance efforts.
D. The Basic Results
Having specified the relationship between the compliance effort x and the
probability of success F(x) as well as the meaning of the F(x) function, we can
now get a sense of how the expected gain from taking an uncertain position
varies with the compliance effort. We start with the most basic case and address
multiple complications later. 89 Figure 1 demonstrates some possibilities
graphically for a simplified gain function featuring a linear cost and a benefit
normalized to unity. 90 Continuing with the example of a corporate transfer of
"substantially all" of the assets, Actor 1 views asset transfers as less costly than
Actor 2. The gain curves G, and G 2 reflecting the private gains of the two
actors result from subtracting the respective cost curves from the same
expected benefit curve represented by the dotted line. So, for example, when
x=0.6, bF(x)=0.5, and C;(x)=0.3. Subtracting the latter from the former (or,
alternatively, adding 0.5 to -0.3) produces the value of 0.2 on the G1 curve.

86.

Petro Lisowsky et al., Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately

Disclosed Tax ShelterActivity?, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 583, 584 n.2 (2013).

87.
Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA. TAX
REv. 339, 397 (2005). For another example of this understanding of legal uncertainty, see Anthony
D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 2 (1983).
88.
In this model's terms, there is no uncertainty if x=1 nor if x-0. This is Logue's
view. See Logue, supra note 87. Lisowsky et al. appear to suggest that most aggressive positions (where
x approaches 0) are highly uncertain-a difficult conclusion to defend. See Lisowsky et al., supra note

86.
89.
For instance, convex cost functions are considered later in this section, and in
Sections II.A and II.B, infra. Non-differentiable cost functions are discussed in infra Section III.B. Other
complications are introduced infra Part III as well.

90.

This simplified function has the form of G(x) = F(x) - kx. The linear cost

function means that the company views a transfer of each additional unit of assets as equally
undesirable. Normalization to unity (that is, assuming that b = 1) is a standard move in economic
modeling that eliminates a distraction of a non-consequential fixed variable. See, e.g., Christopher F.
Baum et al., Securities Fraudand CorporateBoard Turnover: New Evidence from Lawsuit Outcomes,

48 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 14, 19 (2016).
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Figure 1: The S-Shaped Probability of Success Curve and the Illustrative Cost
and Gain Functions91
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Several observations follow readily from Figure 1. First, the gain function
is wavy-it has a minimum and a maximum. This presents a problem for
92
determining the actor's privately optimal compliance effort x algebraically.
C&C faced the same problem and resolved it by relying on several
assumptions. Two of these assumptions are less warranted beyond the types of
settings (such as speeding and pollution 93) that served as their primary
95
examples. 94 The third one is restrictive and is not made here. Because it is

The probability of success curve F(x) and the curve bF(x) are the same because
91.
b = 1. x, and x2 are the privately optimal compliance efforts of Actor I and Actor 2. x, yields the
maximum gain of G, while x2 yields the maximum gain of zero (meaning that Actor 2 will not engage
in the transaction). xl corresponds to the local maximum G2 on the gain curve for Actor 2. This
maximum is local because that actor would rather abstain from acting than act and expect a negative

gain (G2<0).
The private maximum corresponds to the first derivative G'(x) = 0 (this is the
92.
first-order condition or FOC) and the second derivative G" (x) < 0 (this is the second-order condition or
SOC). In the general case, the SOC is G"(x) = bf'(x) - C"(x). The sign of this expression may be
positive or negative as each term may be greater or smaller than zero. In the simple case depicted in
Figure 1, the SOC is G"(x) = f'(x). Iff(x) has a single peak, as the discussion assumes throughout,
any x satisfying the SOC that exceeds the peak corresponds to the maximum.

93.

See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 967, 968, 970, 980.

C&C conclude that the private gain function has an internal maximum by
94.
assuming that the SOC is negative. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 282 n.7. They explain that
the first three terms in their SOC are unambiguously negative. However, the first term B"(x) is negative
only if the private benefit function is concave, as C&C assume on page 280. The second term is positive
(it is being subtracted) only if C"(x) > 0 (the cost function is convex), as C&C assume on page 280 as
well. (An alternative, less restrictive assumption that C&C also sometimes make is that B"(x) < C"(x).
This allows for a concave cost function and makes it less likely that the first three terms in the SOC are
negative.) So the first three terms are indeed negative only as long as C&C's assumptions hold. As
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impossible to solve the model algebraically in the general case, 96 the following
analysis relies on simulations (much of C&C's analysis does the same).97
The second observation is that the privately optimal compliance effort
x -the value of x corresponding to the highest point on the gain curve-may
lie inside the [0,1] interval or at zero. That is, a rational actor facing an
ambiguous legal standard may choose to take an uncertain position (x* = 0.8
for Actor 1) or abstain from acting altogether (x = 0 for Actor 2). For a given
likelihood of success (same F(x)), higher costs reduce the expected gain 98 and
may make the gamble not worth taking. 99 None of this is surprising. C&C
clearly showed that rational actors may take uncertain legal positions. They did
not investigate the choice of not acting at all, but their model would easily
produce this result.
mentioned in the text, these are plausible assumptions when one thinks about accident-producing
behavior, but not in many other cases. For instance, the benefits from gradually monopolizing an
industry, from increasing network coverage over a given territory, or from investing in technology
whose adoption involves a tipping point are all likely to be convex rather than concave (as C&C
assume) at least over some range of x.
95.
As C&C state (and assuming that the sum of the first three terms is indeed
negative), the SOC is negative "as long as F"(x)L(x) never takes on a large negative value .... If the
density function is single-peaked [an assumption also made here], this is equivalent to assuming that it
does not fall away extremely rapidly at values of x above the value at which it peaks. For the remainder
of the paper, we will make this assumption." Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 282 n.7. The shape of
the benefit and loss function, as well as the density function, affect what "extremely rapidly" means in
any given case. The general point, however, is that as the law becomes increasingly clear-as
uncertainty declines-the density function does indeed begin to fall extremely rapidly at values of x
above the peak. At that point, C&C's model no longer yields a clear prediction of individual behavior
even given a concave benefit and convex loss functions that they assumed.
96.
Technically, the problem arises because it is impossible to sign the SOC. By the
"general case," I mean the case where the cost function is not necessarily linear and the restrictive
assumptions made by C&C may not be made.
97.
1 produced simulations using Microsoft Excel. I input the x values (from 0 to 100,
or 0 to 1,000 to match C&C's approach) manually as the first column. The second column reflected the
corresponding values of a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F(x). Where possible (such as for a
normal distribution), these values were generated using Excel's built-in formulas and manually chosen
CDF parameters (such as the mean and the standard deviation for a normal distribution). In the absence
of built-in formulas (such as for a triangular distribution), the CDFs were constructed manually. The
third column contained the values of a cost function corresponding to each value ofx. For these
Article's original simulations, the cost function was either linear or convex. For replicating C&C's
simulations the cost function matched the one that they used. The fourth column contained the values of
the G(x) function reflected in supra note 48 for the Article's original simulations and supra note 50 for
the replications of C&C's simulations. I used a built-in Excel function to find the maximum value of the
gain function in the G(x) column. I then identified the values ofx', F(x*), and G(x*) produced by the
distribution with particular parameters (such as a specific mean and standard deviation of a normal
distribution). Finally, I repeated this process while varying the CDF parameters and CDF functional
forms.
98.
This result may be shown algebraically as well, and it is not restricted to linear
cost functions. Assume that the cost function has a form of C(x) = kxt (t-l corresponds to a linear
cost, t-2 to a linear marginal cost, and higher values of t correspond to steeper cost functions).
Differentiating the gain function with respect to the two cost factors yields: dG(x) /k

= -xt, which is

negative for any x > 0; aG(x) Ot = -kxt In x, which is non-positive for any x > 0 and t

1.

99.
If the cost function is non-linear, and if we assume, as is conventional in the
literature, that C(x) = 0; C'(x) = 0, the actor will abstain from acting if extending any compliance
effort at all gives rise to a fixed cost-something that is likely to be true in most cases.
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Another insight suggested by Figure 1 is that higher compliance costs
induce rational actors to diminish their compliance efforts. For example, xi in
Figure 1 is greater than x2 (the effort corresponding to the local, rather than
global, G2 maximum). 00 This is not an accident. Consider what would happen
if the cost of compliance were to go down to zero. The gain curve would then
coincide with the dotted S-shaped line, and the maximum gain would be
reached for x* equal to one-the position assuring certain compliance. If
compliance is costlier, however, perfection no longer makes sense.
These results are useful but hardly path-breaking. One reiterates C&C's
well-known finding; others follow from their model. Another question arising
from examining Figure 1 is quite different. It is addressed next.
E. From Deterrenceto Compliance
The simple yet fundamental question is this: How should we evaluate the
actor's compliance effort, x*? In the optimal deterrence framework adopted by
C&C, the answer is clear: we should evaluate x* by comparing it to the socially
optimal effort xs .101 The closer the x* is to xso, the better. If x * exceeds xso, we
have under-deterrence; if x* is below xso then over-deterrence results. Think of
60 mph as the socially optimal speed and the uncertain negligence standard
producing a single-peak density function centered on 0.6. If the standard
induces drivers to go 90 mph, uncertainty leads to under-deterrence; if they
drive 55 mph, the law slightly over-deters.
But what if we have no view about the efficiency of the law? How should
we assess actor's choices in the absence of the socially optimal level as a
reference point? To the best of my knowledge, this deceptively simple question
has not been addressed in the economic analysis of law.102
This is a fundamental problem that must be resolved before the analysis
can move forward. For instance, the value of x* in Figure 1 is 0.8. Is this low
or high? How should we evaluate a particular position when the law is neither
certain nor socially optimal?
There are at least two possible ways of doing so. First, we may ask what
value of x we would pick if we were choosing a single number as the best
approximation for separating legal and illegal conduct. The most reasonable

100.

As mentioned earlier, Actor 2 would not choose x2, but rather abstain from

acting altogether.
In Shavell's model, the answer is also clear: we should compare x* to the
101.
exogenous level of due care.
The only alternative to the optimal deterrence theory in the law and economics
102.
literature is the so-called complete deterrence approach. That approach does not assume socially optimal
legal rules, but it generally treats legal rules as clear, giving rational actors a binary choice of complying
or violating the law. In that setting, the obvious way to evaluate a private decision is by checking
whether it is legal. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 215-218. Importantly, in both the
optimal and the complete deterrence settings, there is a precisely specified value of x that separates
desirable from undesirable behavior.
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answer is the value that most legal experts would identify if they had to give a
single number for the meaning of an uncertain standard. This is the value of x
corresponding to the peak of the density function f(x)-the value reflecting the
prevailing, most common interpretation. For many plausible probability
distributions, this peak value corresponds to F(x)=0.5, the 50% probability of
success.1 03 Let us call this peak value x.
A useful feature of i is that, to put it bluntly, it is the only clear
benchmark other than zero and one for a single-peak probability distribution.
It reveals information in a setting where no other obvious benchmark exists.
And this information is useful. Most importantly, focusing on it highlights the
relativity of x. It is impossible to decide whether any given x is high or low
without knowing the corresponding i.
This point is obvious to any legal practitioner. If a company must transfer
"substantially all" assets to secure a regulatory benefit (a fairly high it),
transferring 60% may not be enough. If, instead, the threshold is something like
"material" share of assets (a much lower xt), the same 60% level is almost
unassailable.
Finally, xt has a clear connection to Shavell's analysis. He models
uncertainty as an error term around a particular value of x. He places very few
restrictions on the shape of the error distribution, but his key assumption is that
the magnitude of error declines as uncertainty declines.' 05 The most plausible
interpretation of this assumption is that as a vague standard becomes clearer,
the distribution of possible interpretations of that standard converges to t.106
The second way of evaluating x is by investigating the corresponding
probability of success F(x). This approach shifts focus from deterrence to
compliance, from the territory familiar to legal economists to the territory
familiar to legal practitioners.
The importance of the probability of success is self-evident to any lawyer.
It is especially familiar to any counselor engaged in opinion practice. Legal
advisors have developed numerous opinion levels ranging from "will" (very
high likelihood of success) to "reasonable basis" (low but not negligible

103.
This is true for any symmetric distribution such as a normal distribution.
104.
This is clearly true for symmetric distributions because for these distributions, the
mean, the median, and the mode are the same. For skewed distributions, the mean and median must be
calculated, and are sometimes not defined. In contrast, the mode (the technical term for x1) is a defined
value that may be produced by a legal expert's introspection for any single-peak distribution. Note that
the mode is not defined for a uniform distribution. But this distribution is not single-peaked. It is
equivalent to legal experts thinking that any value of x is as likely to assure compliance as any other
value ofx-not a plausible description of reality.
105.
See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 94.
106.
This is not true for a uniform distribution because it has no it. However, as
discussed in supra note 104, a uniform distribution is not a plausible depiction of legal uncertainty. The
statement in the text may also not hold more generally in theory. But it is difficult to imagine, when
talking about legal uncertainty in practice, how a single-peaked distribution of the views of legal experts
would converge to some value of x other than it as uncertainty declines.
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likelihood of success) and even less plausible positions.107 To an outsider, these
opinion levels are extraordinarily nuanced. For instance, the "will" level
includes unqualified "will," "not free from doubt will," and "not entirely free
from doubt will" opinions. Lawyers routinely suggest percentages
corresponding to various opinion levels.o There is some disagreement about
what these numbers are, but everyone agrees that these percentages refer to the
likelihood of success. 109 And clients are extremely sensitive to these
percentages and levels of "comfort." Multi-billion dollar deals depend on
lawyers' conclusions regarding the likelihood that the transaction would
withstand regulatory scrutiny.1 10 Thus, the realities of legal practice leave no
doubt about the importance of F(x).
The American Bar Association's efforts to define the bounds of ethical
legal advice further bolster the point. These efforts (some would say struggles)
make it quite clear that the ABA views the likelihood of success as the key
factor in separating ethical and unethical conduct.III Equally clear is the ABA's
unease with positions that are highly unlikely to prevail.112
Government regulators view the probability of success as an important
factor as well. They also reveal a preference for more compliant (higher
probability of success) positions. And they particularly disfavor positions that
are more likely to be wrong than right.
The SEC, for instance, instructs issuers taking uncertain tax positions that
fall short of the "will" level "to explain why [the counsel or accountant] cannot
give a 'will' opinion."" 3 The Commission does not even contemplate that
issuers would go forward with transactions that are not supported by at least a
"more likely than not" opinion of counsel. 114 The FASB forbids the issuers
from reflecting uncertain tax benefits in financial statements unless the issuer
believes that there is more than a 50% chance that the benefit will be

These are described by standards like "not frivolous" or a "reporting position."
107.
See Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, PaintingAccounting Practitioners
108.
into a Tax Practice Corner, 108 TAX NOTES 1399, 1399 (2005) (describing various opinion levels and
the corresponding probabilities of success).
See Kyle Logue, Tax Law Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 VA.
109.

TAX REV. 339, 357 (2005).
For example, the $33 billion Williams-Energy Transfer merger hinged entirely on
110.
whether one elite law firm reasonably refused to give a "should" opinion while another elite law firm
believed that such an opinion would properly reflect the state of the law. See supranote 15.

111.

See ABA Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reconsidering ABA Formal Op. 314 (1965).

See id. for a discussion of concerns with lawyers endorsing positions supported
112.
by merely a "colorable claim"-a less likely to succeed position than the one that has "some realistic
possibility of success," which, in turn, is less likely to succeed than a position supported by "substantial
authority"-the threshold required by the Internal Revenue Code to avoid penalties for undisclosed

positions. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2012).
SEC Staff
113.

Legal

Bulletin

No.

19

¶

III.C.4

(Oct.

14,

2011),

http://www.sec.gov.interps/legal/cfslb.19.htm.

114.

Id.
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sustained.
Congress is willing to forgive tax penalties if "the taxpayer
reasonably believed that [the] treatment was more likely than not the proper
one." And the Treasury Department likened legal opinions that fall short of
the "more likely than not" level to advice plagued by conflicts of interest.117
Overall, government regulators, self-regulatory bodies, and legal
practitioners all care about the likelihood that an uncertain position would be
upheld on review. So the second way of assessing the actor's compliance effort
is by evaluating the resulting probability of success.
Note that this probability has one obvious advantage over x". The latter is
just one point in a distribution; the former is a continuous variable spanning
certain compliance and certain noncompliance. Focusing on the probability of
success leads to a greater precision in evaluating rational responses to legal
standards even if the law does not maximize efficiency and the optimal
deterrence theory is unhelpful. We now turn to this evaluation.
II. Investigating the Model
Adopting the probabilistic compliance framework allows us to analyze the
model introduced in Part I-or the similar model studied by C&C-from a new
perspective. We can investigate whether higher (or lower) legal uncertainty
induces rational actors to take more compliant, higher probability of success
positions. We can inquire into the private consequences of these decisionswith and without taking account of the market for legal advice. And we can ask
how policymakers should react to private responses to legal uncertainty if
policymakers care about compliance. This Part tackles these and related
questions.
A. The FamousAmbiguity Reexamined
We begin this investigation by reexamining the best-known result reached
by both C&C and Shavell regarding the effect of legal uncertainty on individual
behavior-their conclusion that uncertainty may lead to either over- or underdeterrence even if the legal standard is set correctly on average.
Shavell
reaches this result with very few assumptions about the shape of legal
uncertainty. However, his analysis is highly general, making it difficult to get a

115.
See Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48, Accountingfor
Uncertainty in Income Taxes (2010).

116.

I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3) (2012).

117.

See Practice Before IRS-Best Practicesfor Tax Advisors-Shelter Opinions,

T.D. 9165, 2005-1 C.B. 357, replaced by T.D. 9668, 2014-27 I.R.B. 1.
118.
For C&C, "correctly" means socially optimally. See Calfee & Craswell, supra
note 1, at 974. For Shavell, "correctly" means at the level of due care that an actor would choose in the
absence of uncertainty. See SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97.
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sense of its practical implications.' Moreover, no one has succeeded in
extending Shavell's model beyond his key finding in three decades. C&C
obtained their result by relying on simulations, and this Article follows the
same approach.
In order to generate their simulations, C&C needed to assume a functional
form of legal uncertainty. As is common, they assumed that it is normally
120
However, a normal distribution is
distributed, and this Article does the same.
rather than [0,1]. This Article's
infinity
plus/minus
of
range
the
on
defined
fit the [0,1] interval by choosing
to
distribution
original simulations truncate the
such parameters (mean and variance) that the probability of occurrence (the
density function) at either end of the [0,1] interval is equal to zero up to three
decimal points. 121 This assures that for x approximating zero (almost no effort
to comply) the probability of success is almost zero as well, while for x
approximating one (almost the highest possible compliance effort) the
probability of success is also one (100%).122 As will become clear shortly,
C&C did not impose similar restrictions in their simulations.
C&C interpret their results by focusing on what this Article calls the
compliance effort x . They determine privately optimal efforts corresponding to
various degrees of uncertainty and compare them to the socially optimal value
of xso. What would happen if we shift the analytical framework from deterrence
to compliance, from comparing x to xso to evaluating the value of F(x*)?
It turns out that this question has the same answer if we consider this
Article's model or C&C's formula. To emphasize the general nature of that
answer, it is presented here using C&C's original simulations. Table 1
replicates one of their scenarios (a combination of the gain and loss functions
and a normal distribution with a particular mean) in the first two columns.123

Conceptually, of course, the general form of Shavell's proof makes it especially
119.
valuable. But practically, his conclusion that uncertainty leads to over-deterrence as long as "the
distribution of the deviations is not too dispersed" gives the reader no way of assessing what "too
dispersed" might mean. In contrast, simulations offer a better sense of the extent of uncertainty,
including in situations when the results become questionable. See infra text accompanying notes 130-

133.
For a recent example of using a normal distribution assumption to model legal
120.
uncertainty, see Hoeppner & Lyhs, supra note 71, at 6. A related literature on litigation settlement
predominantly relies on this assumption as well. See Marc Poitras & Ralph Frasca, A Unified Model of
Settlement and Trial Expenditures: The Priest-KleinModel Extended, 31 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 188,

190 (2011).
This is a crude solution. A transformation that would convert the distribution's
121.
[-co,+oo] range into [0,1] range would be preferable. This was not the path followed by C&C, however,
and I do not follow it here.
In other words, this assures that F(x) satisfies one of the basic features of a
122.
cumulative density function. See supranote 83.
See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 284 tbl.1 (column corresponding to the
123.
mean of 500).
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The third column is new, and it shows the values of the probability of success
for each choice of x* reported by C&C.1 24 The results are quite striking.1 25
Table 1: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Privately Optimal
Compliance Effort and the Corresponding Probability of Success
St Dev

x*

F(x*)

1
10
50

497
476
425

1.00
0.99

100
200

407
429

08
0.64

0.93

31 00

466

0.55

400

500

0.50

500
1000

529
626

0.48
0.45

The first two columns show that even when legal uncertainty is symmetric
and centered on the social optimum (here, xo=x=500) both under- and overdeterrence are possible. The behavior is optimal when uncertainty is
vanishingly small (the distribution's standard deviation a-a basic statistical
measure of uncertainty-is equal to 1) or very significant (o-400).126 But when
uncertainty is high, under-deterrence results,1 27 and when uncertainty is lower
we observe over-deterrence. Moreover, the relationship between uncertainty
and deterrence is non-monotone. Starting with extreme uncertainty (o7=1000), a
decrease in uncertainty first moves the actor's choice from under-deterrence to
the optimum (1000>u>400), then produces increasing over-deterrence
(400>a>100), and finally reduces over-deterrence bringing the behavior back
to the optimum (1 00>u>1). In stark contrast, when we turn from deterrence to
compliance (that is, the probability of success F(x)), the relationship is much
more straightforward: lower uncertainty leads to greater compliance.
This is no small difference. Private choices viewed as equivalent in
C&C's framework are anything but equivalent in the present one. For instance,
C&C's simulations show that both high uncertainty (o-400) and extreme

124.
Because C&C use F(x) as a probability of liability (bad outcome), while I use
F(x) as a probability of success (good outcome), the F(x) values reported in the table correspond to (IF(x)) values in the C&C's simulations.
125.
All simulations and graphs are available upon request to the author.
126.
This and similar statements treat x'=497 as essentially equal to 500.
127.
Recall that in C&C's setup, higher values of x* are less socially desirable (think
of higher speeds), while in the present setup higher x* reflects greater compliance (think of transferring
more assets to satisfy the "substantially all" standard).
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certainty (al) induce private actors to take the socially optimal position
(x*=500). But from the compliance perspective, the two could not be more
different. High uncertainty (o=400) leads merely to a plausible but hardly
indisputable fifty-fifty position (F(x)=0.5), while extreme certainty induces
certain compliance (F(x)=1). Relatedly, some changes viewed as undesirable
in C&C's optimal deterrence framework are clearly desirable if one prefers
more compliance to less. For instance, as the standard deviation changes from
400 to 100 (legal uncertainty decreases), the behavior gets worse (x* falling
away from xso) from the optimal deterrence perspective while those concerned
with compliance would conclude that the behavior improves (F(x*) increases
from 0.48 to 0.82).
These results are not idiosyncratic. In fact, every C&C scenario featuring
a symmetric distribution centered on xso yields the same monotone relationship
between uncertainty and the likelihood of success. Moreover, the same is true if
we ignore xso and focus on x, similar to Shavell. In each of the forty scenarios
reflecting symmetric distributions128 the same result holds: lower uncertainty
leads to greater compliance. Notably, this is true regardless of the location of
the distribution's mean in the [0,1] range.
There are two important caveats to this strong claim. First, sometimes a
change in uncertainty may not matter. If, for example, an actor chooses to
abstain from taking an uncertain position, a change in uncertainty may make
the actor even less likely to act.129 Second, in some of C&C's scenarios (nine
out of forty), the monotone relationship between uncertainty and compliance
does not hold for the entire range of uncertainty they study. However, in each
case where this relationship reverses, a normal distribution is not a plausible
representation of legal uncertainty. In those cases, the level of uncertainty
producing the reversal is so high that the lowest and/or highest values of F(x)
are not close to zero or one.130 This means that even outright evasion leads to a
significant likelihood of success (recall that perfect detection is assumed), and
even perfect compliance results in a significant probability of being viewed as
illegal. In contrast, both the frequentist and the subjectivist understandings of
legal uncertainty demand that the relevant probability varies from zero to one
within the uncertain range. 131 Thus, we should take C&C's scenarios
incorporating the F(x) curve that does not start close to zero and/or does not

&

These are C&C's Tables 1-5 with eight columns per table. See Calfee
128.
Craswell, supra note 1. By symmetric, I mean non-skewed.
Furthermore, extending C&C's simulations to distributions with means closer to
129.
the ends of the [0,1] range yields scenarios where the change in uncertainty does not affect the location
of x* even when actors choose to take uncertain positions. In those additional simulations, x is
determined wholly by the cost and benefit functions that C&C chose for their examples.
Rather, F(x) corresponding to no effort to comply ranges from 8% to over 20%,
130.
increasing to over 30% as the standard deviation reaches 1,000.
Relatedly, an F(x) function that does not start at 0 and end at I fails to satisfy the
131.
basic requirements of a cumulative distribution function. See supra note 83.
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end close to one with great caution.132 In all instances where this problem does
not arise, lower uncertainty leads to greater compliance in C&C's
specifications. 133
One may wonder if this outcome is due to some peculiarity of a normal
distribution. It is not. Re-running one of C&C's scenariosl34 using three
plausible alternative distributions-Logistic, Cauchy, and Triangular-makes
no difference.1 35 All these simulations produce the results similar to those
shown in Table 1: the relationship between uncertainty and x is sometimes
non-monotone but lower uncertainty always leads to greater compliance.
The model offered in this Article yields the same relationship as well.
Figure 2 offers a graphical illustration. Panel A presents three increasingly
certain density functions (the tighter the bell curve, the more certain is the
function) and a linear marginal cost line. Following Table 1, all distributions
are centered on 0.5. The privately optimal values of x correspond to intercepts
between the marginal cost line and each density function that lies to the right of
that function's peak.136 These intercepts are marked as low, medium, and high,
reflecting the levels of uncertainty. The accompanying numbers in callout
boxes are the precise values of the respective x*.

132.
This is an important caveat because contemporary economic research building on
C&C's analysis continues to study legal uncertainty using distributions with excessively high degrees of
variance. See Hoeppner & Lyhs, supra note 71.
133.
1 was unable to replicate C&C's results for a skewed (not normal) distribution,
see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 291 tbl.6, because I could not guess the three parameters
underlying the distribution.
134.
See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 288 tbl.3 (the column with the mean
value of 500). I chose Table 3 for no particular reason, other than that the benefit and loss functions
modeled in Table 3 are appealingly simple and, therefore, transparent.
135.
These distributions are plausible because (i) they are continuous, (ii) they are
single-peaked, (iii) they may have a mean other than zero (Student's T distribution, for instance, always
has a zero mean), (iv) they produce (in their pure or truncated form) S-shaped F(x) functions on the [0,1]
range for various levels of uncertainty, and (v) they are defined by their parameters in such a way that
varying one of the parameters changes the dispersion of the distribution without changing its mean
(something that is not possible, for instance, for Beta, Gamma, Chi, and some other distributions).
136.
Panel A is a graphical illustration of the first-order condition for the gain
function. The second order condition is G"(x) = f'(x), and it is negative (corresponds to a maximum

G(x)) wheref(x) is declining (i.e., to the right of the peak)).
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Figure 2: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Probability of Success
Function
P anel B
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As is clear from Panel A, a decrease in uncertainty from high to medium
moves x* to the right (from 0.58 to 0.6), while a further decrease from medium
to low moves x* to the left (from 0.6 to 0.55). This reflects the complicated
relationship between uncertainty and x revealed in C&C's simulations. Panel
B tells a different story. It shows the familiar S-shaped curves, with steeper
lines corresponding to tighter, less uncertain probability distributions. Again, a
decrease in uncertainty shifts x* first to the right and then to the left, reflecting
the shifts depicted in Panel A. But in contrast with Panel A, each shift leads to
an increase in the optimal probability of success F(x*). The numbers in the
low/med/high boxes restate the respective optimal compliance efforts x and
add the corresponding values of F(x*). Clearly, the probability of success
increases monotonically as uncertainty declines.
The complex relationship between uncertainty and the compliance effort
is not inevitable. One can easily produce simulations where a decrease in
uncertainty leads to smaller values of x* (always moves x to the left) and
higher values of F(x). The important point, however, is that whatever the
relationship is between uncertainty and x*, lower uncertainty appears to lead to
more conservative, higher probability of success positions. For those interested
in legal compliance, this is a significant finding. A natural question to ask next
is what this means for private actors.
B. Legal Uncertainty and Private Gains
Rational, risk-neutral actors care about their gains. How do these gains
change when a legal standard becomes more rule-like? Figure 3 suggests the
answer. It depicts the same S-shaped curves that appear in Figure 2, adds a
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linear marginal cost curve (the downward sloping dashed line reflecting the
cost function depicted in Figure 2, Panel A 37), and presents the gain curves
resulting from subtracting that cost from each of the three expected benefits
bF(x).
The relationship between private gains and uncertainty is not hard to see.
Even in this case where the optimal compliance effort x changes nonmonotonically as uncertainty decreases, greater certainty leads to greater gains.
Figure 3: The Effect of a Change in Uncertainty on the Gain Function
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This is not an obvious result when the relationship between x and
uncertainty is not monotone. As just discussed, x* is greater than xi. This
means that C(x*) is higher than C(x*). Nevertheless, the benefit of greater
certainty (a steeper F2 compared to F;) exceeds the additional cost of moving
from x* to x*, resulting in a higher peak of the G 2 curve compared to GI. When
the relationship between the compliance effort and the uncertainty level is
monotone, the same result is obvious. Lower uncertainty leads to both less
costly compliance efforts and higher expected benefits due to steeper S-shaped
curves. Both effects increase the maximum gain.

137.
The cost curve in Figure 3 is curved, while it is straight in Figure 2, Panel A,
because the curves in Figure 2, Panel A (both the cost curve and the probability curves) reflect functions
that are first derivatives of the functions that produce the cost and the S-shaped probability curves in

Figure 3.
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C&C's simulations produce similar results. Out of forty scenarios that
they study, only two1 reveal a non-monotone relationship between gains and
uncertainty for the levels of uncertainty where a normal distribution is
appropriate. An almost complete match in the relationship between gains and
uncertainty in C&C's simulations and the ones original to this Article suggests
that this relationship is fairly robust.
The strong (even if not universal) correspondence between uncertainty
and private gains may explain a phenomenon widely observed in legal practice:
lawyers and their clients often complain about legal uncertainty. Even
sophisticated actors such as large firms and their representatives lobby
constantly to clarify, specify, and narrow the rules. Whether in tax, 139
environmental regulation,140 or financial regulation,141 sophisticated actors tend
to prefer rules to standards; that is, they want greater certainty. The model
explains why this preference is rational even for risk-neutral parties: greater
certainty likely means larger private gains.
C. Legal Uncertaintyfrom the Government's Perspective
What about the government's perspective? Should the government prefer
more certainty or less? To answer this question, we need to specify the
government's objective. The dominant economic view of what this objective
ought to be is well-known-it is social welfare maximization. C&C's analysis
adopts this view, and Shavell's study of uncertainty does the same implicitly.
This Article, in contrast, seeks to analyze many existing legal standards
that may not be plausibly assumed to be welfare maximizing even

138.

See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 1, at 288 tbl.3 (the columns with the mean

value of 350 and 400).

&

See, e.g., Kristen A. Parillo, Businesses Would Pay More Taxes for More
139.
Certainty, Survey Says, 148 TAX NOTES 1069, 1069 (2015) (summarizing a Grant Thornton survey of
2,580 businesses in 35 jurisdictions revealing that "three-quarters of companies would support paying
more taxes in exchange for greater clarity from tax authorities regarding what constitutes acceptable tax
planning"); Susan P. Serota, Economic Substance Codification: ABA Has "SubstantialReservations,"
115 TAX NOTES 389, 392 (2007) (reporting comments from the ABA Tax Section urging Congress to
eliminate a provision in the proposed legislation that would create "an entirely new and uncertain
requirement on a wide range of transactions"); Lee A. Sheppard, PartnershipAntiabuse Rule Produces
Anticlimactic Hearing, 64 TAx NOTES 558 (1994) (summarizing sharp disagreements, including within
the tax bar, about the cost of uncertainty created by the proposed antiabuse regulations).
See, e.g., Scott C. Whitney & John S. Donnellon, Lender Liability Under
140.
Superfund After Fleet Factors: An Evaluationof Proposed Corrective Action, I DICK. J. ENVTL. L.
POL'Y 1, 13 (1991) (describing complaints of the American Banking Association about the uncertainty
created by a judicial precedent and the costs of that uncertainty for the lending industry).
See, e.g., David Lucking & Aravind Vinod, A Confused Industry: Uncertainty
141.
Regarding ExtraterritorialApplication of Dodd-Frank Leaves Foreign Swap Dealers in Legal Limbo,
30 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 64, 64-65 (2011) ("Non-US financial institutions are undoubtedly bemused by the
lack of clarity around the Dodd-Frank Act's extraterritorial application."); Michael Wiseman & Andrew
(2012),
Gladin, Dodd-Frank, Basel Ill and the Age of Uncertainty, BANKDIRECTOR.COM
http://www.bankdirector.com/index.php/issues/legal/dodd-frank-basel-iii-and-the-age-of-uncertainty/
(arguing that legal uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act "creates real risks
for financial markets and the U.S. and global economy").
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approximately. The optimal deterrence theory is not particularly helpful or
relevant for policymakers evaluating these real-life, imperfect, uncertain
standards. Two alternatives suggest themselves.
The first one comes from the law and economics of contracts. The
conventional assumption in that literature is that the overall efficiency may be
approximated by focusing on private gains of the contracting parties.1 42 The
same approach has been used in corporate governance scholarship. There, the
social optimum is assumed to coincide with the maximum joint gain of
shareholders and managers.1 43 Equating overall efficiency with private gains is
plausible if externalities and other market failures are unlikely, as may be true
in some settings. It is less plausible for government regulation generally. At the
same time, if the law is inefficient, externalities themselves may not be welfarereducing.'" In any case, in the absence of welfare-maximizing rules, private
gains offer policymakers a useful evaluative criterion.
Another plausible goal that government actors may pursue is compliance.
As already discussed, regulators clearly care about it; they prefer more
compliance to less; they tend to disfavor positions that are more likely to be
wrong than right; and they particularly dislike positions that have a very small
chance of success. 145 All of this seems to suggest that if maximizing social
welfare is not a realistic objective, maximizing compliance is an appealing
alternative. It seems simple, intuitive, and more reflective of the real world than
either welfare or private gain maximization.
A moment's reflection reveals, however, that compliance maximization is
not what regulators want. Even though they generally prefer greater
compliance, they do not require perfection. For instance, Congress could have
required a transfer of "all" assets, rather than "substantially all,"146 in order to
capture a tax benefit. Or it could have designated a fixed percentage of assets
and penalized any company that failed to comply fully. The Supreme Court
could have demanded that a governmental unit explains its permitting decisions
"contemporaneously," rather than "essentially contemporaneously." 147 Or the
Court could have specified a precise number of days as a condition of
sustaining the permitting decision. Why do regulators enact vague standards
that all but invite less-than-full compliance, and then object when compliance is
not close to perfect?

142.

See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing A Legal

Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1082 (1995) (referring to "'efficiencyminded' lawmakers [who] might pursue the narrow goal of maximizing gains from trade"); Benjamin E.
Hermalin, Avery Katz & Richard Craswell, ContractLaw, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1,

13 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
143.

See, e.g., Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and Long-Termism 11

(Columbia Law and Econ. Working Paper No. 526, 2016).
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See supra note 30.
See supra text accompanying notes 107-117.

146.
147.

I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2012).
T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 812 (2015).
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This Article does not develop a theory of enforcement of uncertain legal
commands. The rules-versus-standards literature that explains why both types
of commands exist is well known.1 48 Its basic idea is that standards are
preferable when the policymaker is uncertain where to draw the line and it is
costly to resolve this uncertainty ex ante.1 49 When this happens, ex post caseby-case interpretations both assure appropriate results in individual cases and
gradually convert a vague standard into a clear rule. Notably, if we think of the
latter process as a convergence of a distribution toward the mean, a regulator
should be indifferent about whether any particular interpretation exceeds or
falls short of that mean. After all, a standard will become a rule over time no
matter where individual interpretations happen to fall along the way.
Yet this indifferent attitude is clearly not what lawmakers reveal when
they insist on "more likely than not" or stronger positions even when these
positions are observed by the regulators, 50 or when they impose penalties on
positions with particularly low chances of success.' So while the rules-versusstandards framework explains why lawmakers enact standards in the first place,
it does not explain lawmakers' observed preference for more compliant
positions after the standard is put in place.
One possible explanation reflects multiple levels of regulatory authority.
Congress enacted the "substantially all" test, but the IRS needs to administer it.
For obvious reasons, courts would not allow the IRS to interpret "substantially
all" as "all" (or as "nothing," for that matter), so the agency must accept
compliance efforts lower than x=1 (and higher than x=O) even it prefers these
efforts to be as high (low) as possible. This explanation, however, does not
illuminate the preference for high but not certain compliance of Congress itself.
Perhaps it is related to enforcement costs, or political economy considerations,
or confusion between welfare-maximizing laws and those that are not, or some
other reason. A model explaining this preference would be a great contribution
to the literature. Unfortunately, it does not appear to exist. Thus, this Article's
compliance-focused analysis takes the regulators' preferences as they are.
Regulators clearly care about the probability of success; they often prefer this
probability to exceed 50%, but they do not demand perfect certainty.
To be clear, this discussion does not establish that more compliant
positions are better for the society than less compliant ones. Nor does it
demonstrate that any particular probability of success is socially optimal, most
fair, or otherwise preferable.

148.

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42

DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
See id at 569.
149.
150.

See supra text accompanying notes 113-117.

151.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (imposing a penalty on positions

found to be incorrect by a court if the positions are not supported by a "reasonable basis"-a threshold

significantly below the fifty-fifty level of confidence).
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But the discussion does suggest a way of evaluating the consequences of
legal uncertainty from the government perspective. We can do so by asking
whether, given regulators' revealed preferences, some of the government's
views and enforcement strategies are inconsistent with the government's
compliance-oriented objectives. More specifically, we can identify mistakes in
the regulators' understanding of the relationship between legal uncertainty and
probabilistic compliance. We can also highlight the consequences of
government's action (or inaction) following the enactment of vague standards.
The following two sections take on these tasks in turn.
D. Government's Confusion About the In Terrorem Effect
Uncertain legal commands are pervasive, their promulgators and enforcers
heterogeneous. So one should be cautious with generalizations. It is fair to say,
however, that many regulators believe that legal uncertainty has a desirable in
terrorem effect. Regulated parties, this view suggests, are reluctant to take
aggressive, low likelihood of success positions if they are unsure of what is
legal and what is not. Greater legal certainty, in contrast, emboldens private
actors to be more aggressive.152
Government agencies have expressed this view. 153 Legal advisors and
commentators have stated it.1 54 And even the U.S. Supreme Court has agreed
with it. 55 One way a regulator may exacerbate the in terrorem effect is by
withholding authoritative guidance that would clarify vague standards. The

152.
Anecdotal support for this view is not difficult to find. See, e.g., Marie Sapirie,
The Evolution ofInversions, 148 TAx NOTES 611, 613 (2015) (citing a corporate tax expert's view that
"[w]hen you have the [standard] that has a lot of gray areas, you can't risk being right at the line").
153.
See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, Tax Administration in the 90s: The New "Reign of
Terror," 74 TAXES 227, 234 (1996) (stating that "[t]here have been a number of instances in which the
IRS has indicated its intention to use in terrorem rules as the basis for tax regulation," such as in the
partnership area).
154.
See Marvin Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax
Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 459 (1968) (referring to the in terrorem effect of uncertain rules); Michael
S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal Tax Law: Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm
Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863, 900-01 (2004) ("The
uncertainty created by the vague language of the provision and the lack of guidance generates an in
terrorem chilling effect on U.S. citizens considering expatriation."); Martin J. McMahon, Reflections on
the Regulations Process: "Do the Regulations Have To Be Complex" or "Is Hyperlexis the Manna of
the Tax Bar?, " 51 TAx NOTES 1441, 1446 (1991) ("Finally, where the object of a particular provision is
to protect the fisc against abusive transactions, consideration should be given to the potential in terrorem
value of vague general rules, even though they produce planning complexity.") (emphasis added).

155.

See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (explaining that "[t]he

very intricacy of the plan and the uncertainty as to the scope of its proscriptions make it a highly
efficient in terrorem mechanism"); Bates v. Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) ("[A] person who
contemplates protected activity might be discouraged by the in terrorem effect of the statute. Indeed,
such a person might choose not to speak because of uncertainty whether his claim of privilege would

prevail if challenged."); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (noting that
"[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone ...
boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked') (alteration in original).
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IRS, 156 the Food and Drug Administration, 157 and even State Bar
Associations have all relied on this strategy. Another in terrorem tactic is to
1 59
issue warnings about possible future punitive guidance.
The model offered here explains the likely intuition underlying the in
terrorem view of legal uncertainty. It also demonstrates why this intuition is
wrong.
The origin of this intuition is obvious from Figure 2. A decrease in
uncertainty from moderate to low induces a downward shift in x from 0.6 to
0.55. Such shifts seem undesirable to regulators. The lower the compliance
effort, their intuition suggests, the lower the probability of success. The fewer
assets the company transfers under the "substantially all" test, the more
aggressive is the transaction.
This link between the compliance effort x and the probability of success
F(x) is understandable, but mistaken. The link is understandable because it
does indeed exist if the level of uncertainty is constant. But if uncertainty
changes, the analysis changes as well.160 When the downward shift in x* results
from a change in uncertainty, we cannot assume that a lower effort corresponds
to a lower likelihood of success. Rather, we need to investigate how a change in
uncertainty affects the probability of success directly. And as we now know
from Section II.A, this probability generally increases with greater certainty
even if the compliance effort declines.
The case should not be overstated. The results just discussed come from
simulations. They hold if actors take uncertain positions in excess of fifty-fifty.

156.

See, e.g., Kimberly

S. Blanchard, Guidance Needed for CFC Lending

Transactions, 126 TAX NOTES 201, 202 (2010) (describing how the IRS's refusal to issue guidance has
an in terrorem effect on taxpayers and their counsel); Kirsch, supra note 154 (mentioning the lack of
guidance).
See, e.g., Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without
157.
Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 533 (2015) (observing that "legal uncertainty created by the
lack of [FDA] regulations ... produces an in terroremeffect sufficient to generate large settlements").
See, e.g., Deborah Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94
158.

YALE L.J. 491, 517-18 (1985) (explaining that the lack of published guidelines for "character and

fitness" investigations of applicants to State Bars, combined with the absence of advance rulings by
character committees, leads to great uncertainty and many negative consequences for would-be
lawyers).
See, e.g., Kimberly S. Blanchard, Extensive New Anti-Inversion Rules Issued, 145
159.
TAX NOTES 89, 91-92 (2014) (referring to the in terrorem effect of the IRS warning that if the Service
"can figure out that it has colorable authority to write [interest-stripping] rules," they will do so in the
future to deter inversions); Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects ofREMIC Residual Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV.
149, 245 (1994) (arguing that the IRS's "ominous rumblings . . . created a fair amount of confusion and
uncertainty in the marketplace . . . and no doubt this in terrorem effect was intended") (emphasis added).
As we have seen, a decline in uncertainty (say a shift from F, to F2 to F3 in
160.
Figure 2) may lead to a decline in the compliance effort x*. Even when x' increases (as it does from x, to
x;), that increase is unstable. Eventually, greater certainty leads to a lower compliance effort, assuming
the original effort exceeded xP. For example, privately optimal compliance efforts in Figures 2 and 3
range from 0.55 to 0.6. Imagine that the law becomes perfectly certain, and the line separating legal and
illegal conduct is precisely 0.5 (the mean of uncertain distributions in Figures 2 and 3). Whether an actor
started at 0.55, 0.58, or 0.6, the actor will now choose the effort just above 0.5-he will reduce his
compliance effort.
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Even so, the results are useful. The government may often observe whether
positions exceed the fifty-fifty threshold, and they are likely to do so in any
event.161 And although simulations do not supply irrefutable proof that lower
uncertainty leads to greater compliance, they show that very often it does.
Moreover, the simulations demonstrate convincingly that a reduction of
compliance efforts in response to lower uncertainty does not necessarily mean
more aggressive, less compliant behavior. Thus, higher compliance efforts in
response to greater in terrorem uncertainty are nothing for the government to
celebrate.
This discussion sheds further light on the two evaluative criteria suggested
above: i and F(x). It must now be clear that the latter is not just superior, but is
far superior to the former. i is useful as a rough indicator of whether any
particular x* is more likely to be legal or illegal. But x is a poor guide
otherwise. Assessing private actors' compliance efforts by reference to X, may
seriously mislead policymakers because it restricts their attention to compliance
efforts. Rather, only by considering the values of F(x) can regulators appraise
the effect of a change in uncertainty-whether on private gains or on
probabilistic compliance. The model demonstrates that if policymakers care
about either, greater certainty should often be the government's goal.
Thus, the DOJ and the FTC were probably wise to develop a rigorous
methodology for defining relevant product markets rather than relying on a
vague "effective competition" standard.162 In contrast, the IRS was likely illadvised to replace a relatively clear definition of "substantial business
activities" in its first set of anti-inversion regulations with a vaguer test. In
contrast, the tax agency enhanced taxpayer compliance when it replaced that
test with a clear bright-line rule.1 63
More generally, if a regulator observes private actors' responses to a
vague standard, and if a less uncertain standard would satisfy the regulator's
preferences, the regulator should clarify the standard to increase compliance.
Of course, if a regulator is unsure how to narrow a standard, the regulator
should keep the law vague. In other words, the argument here is only against
uncertainty for uncertainty's sake.
E. Legal Uncertainty and the Marketfor Legal Advice
There exists yet another reason for the government to value legal
certainty. That reason emerges when we consider the market for legal advice.
This market involves sophisticated parties and privileged communications.
Thus, the following discussion is somewhat speculative and is based on

161.
regulator observes the
162.
163.
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As discussed in Section II.F, infra, this is the most likely outcome when a
choice of x.
See supra note 35.
See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
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personal experience in private practice and conversations with numerous legal
experts. Those familiar with this market may decide for themselves whether the
concerns described below ring true.
Until now, we have implicitly assumed that any change in uncertainty is
due to government action. An administrative agency may issue guidance
interpreting a vague standard, or a court may narrow the range of the standard's
possible meanings. However, the law may appear to become more certain to
regulated parties for a very different reason. As legal advisors grapple with
ambiguous terms, and as they interact with each other, they may (and often do)
become increasingly confident in their interpretations of uncertain legal
provisions even in the absence of any authoritative guidance. The perceived
uncertainty declines without any change in the content of the law. Numerous
"rules of thumb" that have emerged in securities regulation,164 tax,165 and
antitrust enforcement,166 among others, are all examples of this process.
This perceived decline is likely to induce rational actors to shift toward
the smaller values of x* as discussed in Section II.A. 167 Notably, this will
happen even if legal advisors interpret the vague standard correctly on average,
that is, if the mean of the single-peak density function reflecting legal
uncertainty remains the same. The perceived tightening of this distribution
alone will often lead to lower compliance efforts.
In terms of the model, the F(x) distribution will remain unchanged while
the compliance effort x will decline. This will yield weaker, more aggressive
positions. Moreover, because greater certainty tends to lead to higher private
gains, an increase in perceived certainty will induce some actors who
previously abstained from acting altogether to go forward with uncertain
transactions. Because the actual uncertainty has not diminished, these
transactions are unlikely to reflect high probability of success. None of this
would make law enforcers happy.

For an example of the rule of thumb interpreting "materiality" of financial
164.
misstatements to mean 5% to 10% of annual income, see Interim Report of the Committee on Capital
Market Regulation, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG. 128 (2006), http://www.capmktsreg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf.
For several examples of how informal market-practice rules of thumb emerged in
165.
response to vague tax standards, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit

Understandings,74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 614-18 (2007).
For instance, the "small but significant and nontransitory increase in price" test
166.
established by the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is generally interpreted to mean "5-10 percent price
increase lasting one year or longer." Wegener, supra note 35, at 156.
A shift to higher values of x' is also possible, though unstable. See supra note
167.

160.
Consider an actor, call him X, who is very similar to the actor described in Figure
168.
3, except that X's compliance cost is slightly higher than those of that actor. As a result, the tip of the G;
curve for X is just below zero and he abstains from acting. If X perceives that uncertainty has decreased
to a point where it is reflected by the steep curve F3(x), X's gain becomes positive (similar to the top of
the G3 curve) and he takes an uncertain position with compliance effort similar to x3 = 0.55. If F3 (x)
was the true level of uncertainty, that compliance effort would lead to a position that is 98% likely to be
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Another common trend among legal advisors should make regulators even
more concerned: these advisors are likely to view an uncertain legal standard as
more and more forgiving. To see why, consider first what happens if the
government gradually relaxes a legal standard. In terms of the model, the
spread of the distribution (the steepness of the F(x) function) stays the same,
but x" shifts downward. The obvious consequence of this shift is a shift of x* in
the same direction: A less demanding legal standard would lead rational actors
to reduce their compliance effort. A slightly less obvious implication is that a
decrease in x' leads to greater gains. This may induce some actors who were
unwilling to engage in transactions facing a costlier standard (higher X') to go
forward with the deal if the standard is easier to satisfy. Figure 4 reflects these
considerations, holding all other parameters constant. 169
Figure 4: The Effect of a Change in the Legal Standard on the Gain Function
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The trend depicted in Figure 4 is unobjectionable as long as the reduction
in x' is due to new information from the authoritative interpreter of the law.
However, a decrease in x/ may have a very different explanation.
When legal advisors face a new uncertain provision, they adopt a
particular interpretation and proceed with advice. Because any interpretation
other than x"=0 forces clients to incur a cost, clients pressure their advisors to
correct. However, because the Fi(x) remains the relevant curve, the same compliance effort corresponds
to a much lower 63% probability of success.
169.
Specifically, as s" declines from 0.7 to 0.3, the peak of the gain curve also shifts
to the right (that is, x' declines). In addition, maximum gains are higher for lower values of x".
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interpret the standard in the least costly way. If regulators remain silent, this
pressure produces a one-way ratchet.
For instance, lawyers begin by issuing "should" opinions stating that 80%
satisfies the "substantially all" test. Some transactions go forward based on
these opinions. If the regulator does not challenge these transactions, legal
170
advisors assume that 80% satisfies the standard for sure. They begin to issue
stronger "will" opinions to clients willing to transfer 80% of the assets, and
"should" opinions to clients transferring less than that. Thus, the prevailing
interpretation of "substantially all" shifts toward less costly positions.
In the model's terms, this means a shift in the perceived distribution
toward the lower values of I, with a corresponding shift in the values of x*.
But the actual distribution remains the same because the law has not changed
since the enactment of the standard. Thus, a downward shift in x produces
much more aggressive positions. Using Figure 4 as an example, a shift from the
actual legal standard reflected (let us assume) by the probability of success
curve F2, to a perceived standard reflected by the curve F3 reduces the
probability of success of the client's position from 91% to 19%.171 Generally,
more actors take uncertain positions, and these positions become more
aggressive. As with a decrease in the perceived uncertainty, this perceived
relaxation of a legal standard undermines compliance.
The remedy for both problems is the same: the government should either
clarify uncertain provisions or counter the false perceptions-be it a perception
of an increased certainty or of increasingly lenient standards-that are likely to
result from the market for legal advice.172
Examples of regulators using all these approaches are not hard to find.
The IRS officials, for instance, occasionally remind practitioners that the
government does not recognize the so-called "Wall Street Rule."' 7 3 Similarly,
the SEC made a point of reiterating that it does not subscribe to the "rule of
thumb" definition of "materiality" for the purposes of financial
misstatements. 174 And even though the Horizontal Merger Guidelines implicitly

170.

They do so rather than assuming, for example, that the resource-constrained

regulator has not had a chance to consider the issue.
That is, x* = 0.43, corresponding to the peak of the G3 curve, produces the value
171.
of F 2 of only 0.19. This, of course, is a rather extreme example.
An unstated assumption in this Section's discussion is that the private actor's
172.
interpretation of an uncertain standard does not influence the government's own interpretation of it. One
can imagine situations where this assumption would not hold, that is, where market practice affects or
even constrains the government's interpretation.
See Sam Young & Lee Sheppard, Korb Slams Textron Ruling, Wall Street Rule,
173.
117 TAX NOTES 204 (2007). According to one IRS official, the "Wall Street Rule" states that "the IRS
can't attack the tax treatment of a transaction if there is a long-standing and generally accepted
understanding of its expected tax treatment." Heather Bennett, Parker Debunks "Wall Street Rule,"
Pushes LTR Preconferences, 100 TAX NOTES 1634, 1634 (2003).
See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug.
174.
19, 1999) (reminding practitioners that the term "material" may not be interpreted to exclude a
"misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a 5% threshold," as "one rule of thumb in
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recognize the "5-10 percent price increase for one year or longer"175 rule of
thumb, they are quite clear that these percentages are not set in stone.76 In all
these and similar cases, the government regulators insisted-wisely-that
vague legal provisions do not become more certain or more lenient over time
merely because practitioners repeatedly interpret them in a particular way. A
regulator may also counter the negative compliance effects of the market for
legal advice by converting an uncertain standard into a clear rule, as the IRS
did in its third and most recent set of anti-inversion regulations. 177
F. The Likely Range of Compliance Efforts
Some of the conclusions discussed above rely on the assumption that
rational agents whose compliance efforts are observed by a regulator are likely
to choose compliance efforts greater than x. Why would this be the case?
The most general assumption about the shape of legal uncertainty made
here is that the density function has a single peak. Given this assumption, it is
theoretically possible that rational actors take uncertain positions either
exceeding or falling short of x. The latter outcome, however, appears to have a
limited significance. In fact, it is difficult to identify a set of parameters that
would produce this result under this Article's model with a normally distributed
legal uncertainty bound by a [0,1] interval.
This outcome is consistent with both C&C's and Shavell's findings.
Shavell concludes that legal uncertainty induces actors to take more than due
care as long as the distribution is not "too dispersed." 78 If the distribution
representing legal uncertainty is single-peaked and symmetric, this means that
compliance efforts will exceed x' if uncertainty is not too high. C&C's
simulations illustrate what "too dispersed" may mean. Many of their results
yield over-deterrence (equivalent to x above x in the present specification),
confirming this Section's conclusion. Some C&C's simulations reveal underdeterrence. However, almost all of the under-deterrence results arise from
unrealistically high levels of uncertainty. 179 If we focus only on C&C's

particular suggests"); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.

REV. 1275, 1346 (2002) (describing the customary rule of thumb).
175.
Wegener, supra note 35, at 146.
176.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM., HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 8-10 (2010) (emphasizing that the FTC and DOJ may "use a price increase that is larger or
smaller than five percent" as "small but significant" in defining the relevant product market).

177.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.7874-3 (adopting a highly specific test based on several clear

numerical thresholds to enable taxpayers to interpret the term "substantial business activities" for
acquisitions completed on or after June 3, 2015).
178.
SHAVELL, supra note 1, at 97.
179.
1 mean "unrealistically high" in the sense discussed in the text accompanying
notes 130-131. To illustrate, consider the point in Table I where greater uncertainty begins to produce
under-deterrence (in this model's terms, x drops below xP). This point corresponds to the standard
deviation of 400. Notably, the probability of success curve reflecting this standard deviation starts at
10.6%. A normal distribution is not a plausible representation of legal uncertainty in this case.
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simulations where this problem does not arise, the vast majority of their results
correspond to agents taking better than fifty-fifty positions in terms of this
Article's framework.
Finally, the conclusion that private parties tend to take better than morelikely-than-not positions is supported by real-life observations. For instance,
corporate reorganizations involving public companies often involve legal
uncertainty regarding their tax-free status. These reorganizations also face
inevitable scrutiny by the IRS. Companies routinely request their law firms to
deliver legal opinions supporting the tax-free nature of the deals. so The degree
of confidence that shareholders demand in this context is typically either a
"will" or a "should" level. The former amounts to something like an 85%95% probability of success (0.85<F(x)<0.95); the latter to a 65%-85%
probability (0.65<F(x)<0.85). At the same time, public companies rarely, if
ever, proceed with transactions when their lawyers can only deliver a "more
likely than not" (F(x) just in excess of 0.5) or a "substantial authority"
(0.3<F(x)<0.5) opinion.182 These observations are consistent with the range of
compliance efforts suggested by this Article's model. They are also consistent
with C&C's analysis to a greater extent than it would appear from observing
C&C's reported simulation results. In a vast majority of simulations featuring
plausible levels of uncertainty, the privately optimal compliance effort x
indeed exceeds x, and the resulting probability of success exceeds 50%.
G. The Effects of UncertainDetection
Until this point, the discussion assumed that every uncertain position or
transaction is scrutinized by the relevant authority. Needless to say, this is not
always the case. For every high-profile tax-free deal guaranteed to attract
attention from the IRS, there are numerous transactions that are unlikely to be
audited or identified on audit. For every merger subject to a clearance by the
FTC and the DOJ, there are many more potentially anti-competitive acts that
are all but certain to escape the regulator's gaze. All of this is well known in
law and economics. In fact, detection uncertainty has been the focus of the
.183
economic analysis of law enforcement since its inception.

180.

See, e.g., Williams Corp., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Equity, L.P., 2016 WL

3576682 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2016) (proposed merger requiring a "should" opinion about the merger's tax
consequences as a condition to closing).
See id.; see also Aabaco Holdings, 2015 Preliminary Information Statement
181.

2015),
16,
(Nov.
45
99.10)
(Exhibit
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1646775/000119312515378561/d7771 I dex991.htm (describing
a "will" opinion from the company's tax counsel in support of a tax-free spinoff).

182.

See Raby & Raby, supranote 108.

183.

See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 412-13 (summarizing the literature).
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Modeling detection uncertainty in the presence of legal uncertainty is
straightforward, at least in the first approximation.184 Detection uncertainty
means that an actor may capture the benefit b no matter how implausible his
legal position is if the regulator does not observe the position. The most
important implication of introducing detection uncertainty is clear from Figure
5. When the likelihood of detection p is sufficiently low, an incentive to
incur any cost of taking an uncertain legal position disappears. The specifics
depend on the model parameters, but there is little doubt that if the likelihood
of detection falls below, say, 10% (curve G 3), the model predicts that rational
actors will simply evade the law.
Figure 5: The Effect of a Change in the Probability of Detection on the Gain
Function
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184.
I do not address here the possibility that detection and legal uncertainty may be
interrelated. Such interrelationship is possible, see Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The
Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MIcH. L. REV. 2185 (1998), but not inevitable, see
Raskolnikov, supra note 62, at 1039.
185.
More precisely, p is the probability that a legally uncertain position will be
scrutinized (for example, both audited and detected on audit). I treat this probability as exogenous, but
this is not always the case. See Yitzhaki, supranote 68.

186.

The

algebraic

form

of the

gain

functions

depicted

in Figure

5 is

G(x) = (1 - p)(b - C(x)) + p(bF(x) - C(x)) = (1 - p)b + pbF(x) - C(x). In other words, by
taking a position x, the actor incurs the cost of C(x) (the last term), captures the gain of b if the position
is not scrutinized (the first term), and obtains the gain of bF(x) otherwise (the second term).
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This result is well-known in the models that posit a world without legal
uncertainty. The point here is that introducing legal uncertainty does not change
the effects of uncertain detection.
The standard response to the imperfect detection problem is also wellknown-the so-called penalty multiplier. If the penalty is based on the benefit
derived by the actor and includes the denial of this benefit, the multiplier equals
(1-P) 187

gain function depicted
Adding a penalty based on this multiplier to the
8
in Figure 5 eliminates the effect of uncertain detection.18 In other words, the
standard multiplier "works" in the presence of legal uncertainty as it does in its
p

.

absence. So if a policymaker prefers more compliance to less, a detection-based
multiplier is a good idea.
This conclusion begs the question. Should the two types of uncertainty be
treated the same? Should the multiplier offset only detection uncertainty, or
legal uncertainty as well? C&C assume that a multiplier should reverse the
effects of all uncertainty, including the legal one,189 and there appear to be no
contrary arguments in the literature.
This conclusion makes sense in the optimal deterrence framework.
Reversing the effects of uncertain liability for external harms makes them
certain in expectation, forcing actors to take full account of the harms they
produce. In the expected value terms, this converts a threshold-based regime
(such as the "reasonable person" standard' 90) into a strict liability regime. As is
well-known, both strict liability and threshold-based regimes such as
negligence may be socially optimal. 191
Although social optimality is irrelevant in the probabilistic compliance
framework, incentives still matter. Reversing the effect of legal uncertainty
See Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and
187.
Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1423, 1430 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin
Feldstein eds., 2002); Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J.

PUB. ECON. 201, 201 (1974).
To reflect the multiplier-based penalty, we would add a new term to the equation
188.
in footnote 186. It would reflect that if the uncertain position is detected (with probability p) and legal
uncertainty is resolved against the actor (with probability (1-F(x))), the actor will pay a penalty equal to
(1-p) b. If we reorganize and simplify the resulting equation, we will end up with the original equation
P

-

for the gain function specified in supra note 48 as follows: G(x) = (1 - p)(b - C(x)) + p [bF(x)
(sp) b(1 - F(x)) - C(x)

=bF(x) - C(x).

See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292-93 (assuming that the standard
189.
multiplier is the inverse of the probability of punishment, which reflects both detection and legal
uncertainty). Gary Becker's foundational work appears to take the same view. See Gary S. Becker,

Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 174 (1968) (defining p as the
probability of conviction, not just detection).

190.

See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1, at 292 n.18, 296 n.23.

191.

See Steven Shavell, Liability for Accidents, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND

ECONOMICS 139, 143-44 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
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means imposing a penalty that would offset the entire expected benefit from
taking an uncertain position, no matter how strong that position happens to
be.92 Just as the detection-related multiplier makes a private actor feel like a
bad result (detection) is assured; the legal uncertainty-based multiplier makes a
private actor feel like a bad result (finding of violation) is assured. Thus, an
uncertain legal standard combined with a multiplier-based penalty aimed at
offsetting legal uncertainty would amount to a complete prohibition. No
rational lawmaker interested in compliance would approve such a regime. After
all, if the policymaker wanted to enact an outright prohibition, it would have
done so without bothering with devising a vague standard.
Thus, legal and detection uncertainty have different normative
significance in this Article's compliance-focused framework. Legal uncertainty
is a design feature; detection uncertainty is a problem to be rectified. Whatever
one thinks about using multipliers in order to offset imperfect detection, those
reasons are inapplicable when we think about responding to uncertain, nonoptimal laws.
It is worth noting that, when the proposed model incorporates detection
uncertainty, it becomes inconsistent with real-life observations. In tax, for
instance, the probability of detection (whether actual or perceived) is
significantly below 10% for many transactions and positions subject to
uncertain legal standards.1 93 The theoretical multiplier-based penalties for these
kinds of detection probabilities are very high. The actual civil tax penalties are
dramatically lower than the multiplier-based ones.194 Moreover, one can take a
very weak yet plausible position (very low but positive value of x) and escape
the specter of criminal sanctions altogether.195 If we assume that jail time, no
matter how unlikely, is an enormous penalty that taxpayers want to avoid at all
costs, the model predicts that they would take positions that will assure their
freedom from criminal sanctions and nothing more. Yet numerous taxpayers,
including highly sophisticated ones, choose to take much less aggressive
positions regarding items that are very unlikely to be scrutinized by the IRS.196

192.

Recall that when uncertainty relates to detection, the multiplier is

. Because

p is the probability that a penalty will be imposed (bad outcome) while F(x) is a probability that a
penalty will not be imposed (good outcome), we need to substitute (1 - F(x)) for p in the multiplier
formula when we turn from detection to legal uncertainty. Thus, the multiplier needed to offset legal
(1-(1-F)
F
uncertainty is
=. Ignoring detection uncertainty to simplify the exposition, and adding a
1-F

1-F

penalty to the basic legal uncertainty model, with the penalty imposed in cases where the agent loses the
benefit (with probability (1 - F(x)) turns the original gain function specified in supra note 48 into

G(x) = bF(x) - C(x)- F(x) b(1 - F(x))
1-F(x)

-C(x).

193.
See Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice To Target
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 701-02 (2009) (summarizing the literature on the actual and

perceived probability of detection by the IRS).
194.
See id.
195.
See BITrKER & LOKKEN, supranote 58, } 114.9.1 n.28.
196.
As many tax practitioners would attest, the taxpayer's goal is often to avoid all
penalties, not just criminal ones.
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The model offered here cannot explain this behavior. In fairness, the
standard economic analysis of compliance in the absence of legal uncertainty is
not only equally incapable of providing the explanation, but it does not even
1 97
recognize the problem of failing to deal with ambiguous legal standards.
Thus, even this model's shortfall is the flip side of its conceptual advances.
III. Expanding the Model
Every model has limitations, and the one presented here is no exception.
This model relies on four main assumptions: a fixed benefit, a single-peak
distribution as a reflection of an uncertain legal command, a smoothly
increasing cost of compliance, and risk-neutral actors. These assumptions
appear reasonable in many settings. Yet each may be questioned. Relaxing any
of the assumptions makes the model more realistic and broadly applicable. But
as this Part demonstrates, relaxing some of the assumptions dramatically
complicates the model, making it difficult to identify even the basic
relationships.
A. Complicatingthe Benefits
The vignettes used to motivate the basic model introduced in Part I are
realistic, yet they do not capture many real-life scenarios. To start, each
vignette reflects the assumption that the actor's benefit is fixed. This need not
be the case. The benefit may vary in many ways. Most importantly for the
purposes of the model, the benefit may vary with x.
Consider again the corporate law vignette involving the board of directors
deciding how many costly fairness opinions to obtain in order to defend a
transaction in court. The vignette posited that getting fairness opinions is
costly, but this cost has nothing to do with the benefit from the potential
corporate transaction. There are enough friendly bankers, the vignette
suggested, to render as many board-friendly opinions as the board is willing to
pay for. But it may well be the case that the more opinions the board solicits,
the greater the chance that an opinion will conclude that the transaction is not
fair at the price preferred by the board. So not only does getting more opinions
lead to higher overall fees paid to the bankers, it also raises the possibility that
the $100 million benefit will decline. In these and many other cases, a greater
compliance effort x yields both a greater cost and a smaller benefit. In terms of
the model, the benefit is no longer a constant, b. Rather, it is a function B(x).
Relaxing the fixed benefit assumption makes the model even more similar
to C&C's and Shavell's specifications. As discussed throughout, C&C's
simulations produce results that are similar to those generated by the basic
The familiar puzzle from that analysis is why taxpayers comply rather than
197.
evade. This puzzle reflects the binary decision facing taxpayers in standard enforcement models that do
not recognize legal uncertainty.
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model offered here, especially if we disregard the results arising from the
implausible levels of uncertainty. Thus, extending the model to include variable
benefits is unlikely to undermine the Article's key findings. 1 98
B. Complicatingthe Costs
The basic model assumes not only that the cost of compliance increases
with x, but also that it does so gradually.199 While this assumption is standard in
economic models, many realistic cost functions are not gradual.
Consider, again, a company about to engage in a tax-free sale and facing
the "substantially all" test. Recall that the lawyers advise the company that the
most likely meaning of "substantially all" is somewhere around 60%. It is quite
plausible that the company would want to sell half (or some other fraction) of
its assets in any case-but not more than that. So when the company is
considering how much costly compliance to undertake, the company's cost is
zero for x between 0 and 0.5, and is positive after that. In other words, the cost
curve may have a kink at 0.5, and it may even have a notch-a jump from zero
to a value meaningfully different from zero-at this point. 200
Things may be even more complicated. Perhaps the company faces some
non-tax regulatory hurdles if the percentage of assets transferred exceeds a
particular threshold. This introduces another kink (or notch) in the cost
function. Many similar scenarios may be easily envisioned for other vignettes
introduced at the beginning of the Article. More generally, cost functions may
not be smooth, and may have all sorts of discontinuities.
This would present problems for the analysis. If the cost function has
kinks and notches, it is impossible to solve the model algebraically.
Simulations become more difficult as well, and highly sensitive to the location
and the magnitude of notches and kinks. All of this weakens the model's
predictive power. Recall, for instance, that the model predicts that rational
actors would rarely take positions that have less than a fifty-fifty chance of
being upheld on review. Kinks and notches may cause a privately optimal
compliance effort to be smaller than x. In fact, to the extent that rational actors
are observed taking aggressive uncertain positions that are more likely to be
wrong than right, a plausible explanation consistent with the model is that these
actors have non-gradual cost functions.

198.
An interesting special case of a variable benefit function is a benefit that is
proportional (directly or inversely) to x. This specification describes all sorts of valuation problems-an
important subset of choices under uncertainty in several areas of the law. A detailed analysis of
uncertain valuations is beyond this Article's scope.
199.
More precisely, the model assumes that the cost of compliance is differentiable.
200.
This, for example, will be the case whenever the compliance effort gives rise to a
fixed cost. A notch is a jump in a function, while a kink is a sharp turn. See Joel Slemrod, Buenas
Notches: Lines andNotches in Tax System Design, 11 J. TAX RES. 259, 259 (2013).
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C. Complicatingthe Actor's Position
The actor's compliance effort in the basic model reflects a variation along
a single dimension. The x-axis reflects a percentage, a time period, a quantity,
or some other number. This assumption reflects plenty of real-life legal
standards, but certainly not all. The law is full of multi-factor tests. In tax, for
instance, a legal expert needs to balance as many as ten or more different
factors to decide whether a security is debt or equity,201 whether a worker is an
employee or a contractor,202 and so on. Can a single dimension (x) represent
such multi-factor analysis?
It can. To see how, imagine a two-factor test. For instance, assume that
whether a security is debt or equity for tax purposes depends on its maturity
and subordination. Because interest on debt is deductible but dividends on
stock are not, a corporate issuer would prefer a debt characterization. However,
the issuer would also prefer a longer maturity and deeper subordination as a
203
matter of economics, and both features make security more equity-like.
Thus, shortening the term of the security and increasing its seniority is costly,
but also makes the debt characterization more likely.
How would an issuer choose the best maturity-seniority combination? It
would start by ascertaining the cost of each combination. It would then arrange
these combinations in order of increasing costs (with more than one
combination possibly producing the same cost). Finally, the issuer would
evaluate the cost-benefit tradeoff along the lines suggested by this Article's
model. Importantly, the vector of increasingly costly maturity-seniority
combinations is the present model's x-axis.
Needless to say, this exercise becomes exceedingly complicated when the
number of factors increases. But greater complexity only means that real-life
decision-makers do not engage in this exercise with a great degree of precision.
At the same time, there is no doubt that these decision-makers and their legal
advisors do evaluate the very tradeoffs exemplified in the two-factor example
every time they make decisions in the presence of an uncertain multi-factor
test. Thus, accounting for more complex positions does not undermine the
present model.
D. IncorporatingRisk Preferences
Finally, the model assumes risk-neutral actors. This assumption is not
always plausible. Introducing risk preferences raises several difficult questions.
First, moving along the x-axis changes both the expected value and the
degree of risk incurred by the private actor. The standard way of investigating

1 91.10.2.

201.

See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supranote 58,

202.

Seeid.1111.5.2.

203.

For a discussion of these factors, among many others, see I.R.S. Notice 94-47,

1994-1 C.B. 357.
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such compound changes is to disaggregate them into a riskless variation of the
expected value and a series of zero-sum risky bets.204 Up to this point, the
model focused only on the first element of this combination-the expected
value variation-because risk-neutral actors have no preferences over different
zero-sum bets. Once risk-averse actors enter the picture, we must address the
second element.
Doing so presents a challenge. The basic approach to modeling the cost of
risk is the so-called mean-variance model.205 That model is based on an
approximation that establishes a proportional relationship between the cost of
risk measured by the risk premium and the dispersion of risky payoffs.206 That
approximation, however, is accurate only for small risks or in special cases
where the entire distribution may be fully described by its mean and
variance.207 More generally, risk premium depends on the properties of a
probability distribution other than its mean and variance,208 and, relatedly, on
higher order derivatives of the actor's utility function. 209 Recent experimental
research suggests that utility functions traditionally used to model risk aversion
may fail to reflect people's higher-order risk preferences. 210 None of this work
has been applied to the analysis of legal uncertainty as far as I know.
Second, the uncertainty just discussed relates solely to the chance of
losing the benefit. However, many uncertain rules are also risk-based.211 For
example, a rule may require the taxpayer to retain an uncertain amount of
unwanted risk of loss. In contrast with the risk discussed in the previous
paragraph, the risk resulting from risk-based rules increases monotonically
(though not necessarily linearly) with x. The model's cost function C(x) already
reflects this kind of cost. However, when C(x) is understood as arising from the
risk imposed by risk-based rules (rather than fees paid to bankers or expenses
of selling assets) it may be possible to reflect some of the standard assumptions
about risk tolerance-such as the constant relative risk aversion-in the
expected utility calculations. 212

204.

See Louis EECKHOUDT ET AL., ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS UNDER

205.

See id.

206.
207.

This is called the Arrow-Pratt approximation. See id at 11.
Examples of such distributions include normal, lognormal,

RISK 7 (2005).

and gamma

distributions.
208.
More precisely, the premium depends on all four central moments of a
distribution. See EECKHOUDT ET AL., supranote 204, at 12.
209.
See Cary Deck & Harris Schlesinger, Exploring Higher Order Risk Effects, 77

REV. ECON. STUD. 1403, 1404 n.2 (2010).
210.
See id at 1416.
211.
See Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax PlanningUnder Risk-Based Rules, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1181 (2008); Daniel N. Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of CapitalIncome, 50
TAX L. REv. 643 (1995).
212.
For a discussion of constant relative risk aversion utility functions, see, for
example, EECKHOUDT ET AL., supranote 204, at 67.
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Finally, the probability of success that lawyers convey to a client for a
particular value of x is itself uncertain. This is the so-called ambiguity-lack of
clarity about the probability that a particular event will occur.213 Importantly,
the extent of ambiguity surrounding uncertain legal commands varies with x.
For values of x corresponding to very small and very large values of F(x) the
ambiguity is small; otherwise it may be considerable. For example, when a
lawyer advises a client that there is a 95% chance of obtaining a benefit, the
lawyer is likely to be fairly confident in the 95% level. If nothing else, this
number has a clear and not-too-distant upper bound. In contrast, when a lawyer
states that obtaining a benefit is a 50-50 bet, the lawyer may admit that his
confidence in the 50-50 number is not that high, so the bet may be 40-60 or 6040. Needless to say, a client may view such ambiguity as an additional cost.
In sum, introducing risk- and ambiguity-related preferences into the model
complicates the analysis considerably, but promises novel and interesting
insights. Research into these topics has barely begun.214
IV. Probabilistic Compliance and the Complete Deterrence Theory
Until now, we have contrasted the probabilistic compliance approach
offered here to the theory of optimal deterrence. Although this theory is indeed
the dominant economic approach for evaluating legal regimes, it is not the only
one.
The alternative approach developed by legal economists is that of
complete (or absolute) deterrence.215 While optimal deterrence focuses on
maximizing efficiency, complete deterrence aims to ensure compliance.
Optimal deterrence generally achieves its goals by forcing actors to internalize
the external harms of their acts.216 Complete deterrence aims to deny violators
all gains from their violations.217
The complete deterrence theory is not a legal economist's first choice. Its
normative appeal is weak-why insist on enforcing bad laws? Its gain-based
sanctions may lead to large social losses if courts make even small mistakes in
assessing the offender's gain-a deficiency that the optimal deterrence
approach does not share.2 18
213.

See Talley, supra note 85, at 763-65. When the probability judgment is

subjectivist, ambiguity refers to the confidence in one's subjective judgment about a future event.
See Joshua Teitelbaum, A Unilateral Accident Model with Ambiguity, 36 J.
214.

LEGAL STUD. 431 (2007); Luigi A. Franzoni, Optimal Liability Design Under Risk and Ambiguity
(Quaderni-Working Paper DSE No. 1048, 2016).
215.

See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties,

87 GEO. L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (using the "complete deterrence" term); Jeffrey S. Parker, Criminal
Sentencing Policy for Organizations: The Unifying Approach of Optimal Penalties, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 513, 552 (1989) (using the "absolute deterrence" term); Raskolnikov, supranote 184, at 218-19.

216.

See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 408.

See Hylton, supra note 215, at 421.
217.
See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the
218.
Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 432 (1994).
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The appeal of the complete deterrence theory is practical, not theoretical.
In contrast with the optimal deterrence theory, the complete deterrence theory
does not rely on an unrealistic assumption of efficiency-maximizing rules.
Moreover, numerous statutory sanctions in criminal law, securities regulation,
antitrust law, and tax law, to take some examples, explicitly aim at denying the
offenders gains from their violations. 219 These gain-based sanctions strongly
link the complete deterrence theory to real-life regulatory regimes.
Despite this appealing connection, the complete deterrence theory has had
a decidedly limited reach. Perhaps in response to the doubts about the theory's
normative foundations, its proponents usually limit their analyses to acts that
may not plausibly be viewed as socially desirable. Violent crime, tax evasion,
and egregious harms deserving punitive damages are the typical examples.220
Not surprisingly, the complete deterrence literature has ignored legal
uncertainty. If the goal is to deter an activity completely, any uncertainty that
potentially permits the activity is undesirable.221
Yet plenty of legal uncertainty exists in regulatory regimes that rely on
gain-based sanctions and do not address egregious, reprehensible, violent acts.
For instance, while criminal tax evasion is subject to gain-based fines, so are
the tax positions that are possibly legal but ultimately found to be incorrect.222
Gain-based sanctions also apply to civil securities law violations,223 civil
environmental violations, 224 and many other transgressions that by no means
arise from activities that should be obviously deterred altogether. Do gainbased sanctions make sense for these less-than-absolutely undesirable
activities? What incentives do these sanctions create when they enforce
uncertain laws? Most generally, what can the economic analysis tell us about
gain-based sanctions if we abandon the all-or-nothing complete deterrence

219.

For example, the penalty for insider trading is based on "the profit gained or loss

avoided," 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2) (2012), the Criminal Fines Improvement Act penalizes many white-

&

collar crimes by fines that are "not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss"
captured or caused by the offender, 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), and the accuracy-related tax penalties are
based on the amount of tax underpayment, I.R.C. § 6662(a).
220.
See Hylton, supra note 215, at 422; David Markell, Is There a Possible Role for
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objective and admit the reality of legal standards that are both uncertain and
non-optimal?
As is probably obvious by now, these are the questions that this Article
begins to answer. Recall that the bulk of the discussion assumes that the only
consequence of the actor's noncompliance is losing the benefit. This is
precisely what a gain-based sanction is. Thus, this Article extends the economic
analysis of gain-based sanctions to settings where law is uncertain and where
complete deterrence is neither plausible nor desirable. Perhaps, we should start
referring to gain-based (rather than complete) deterrence, and investigate its
implications for a much broader range of violations than the complete
deterrence theory has studied thus far. The probabilistic compliance perspective
offered here would allow us to do just that.
Conclusion
This Article investigates a familiar model of legal uncertainty from a new
perspective. It does so by shifting the focus from deterrence to compliance,
from the actor's choice of effort to the probability of success of the actor's
position. This shift yields new insights. It also necessitates an inquiry into the
meaning of compliance when the law is uncertain.
The Article's main takeaways may be summarized as follows. First, the
famously ambiguous relationship between legal uncertainty and deterrence
does not extend to the relationship between legal uncertainty and compliance.
Rather, greater certainty mostly leads to greater compliance. Second, greater
certainty likely leads to higher private gains. Third, the market for legal advice
tends to increase the perceived certainty of the law and make uncertain
standards appear more permissive. Both effects induce less compliant, more
aggressive positions and increase the number of actors choosing to take them.
Fourth, the standard penalty multiplier offsets detection uncertainty whether or
not legal uncertainty is present. However, incorporating the multiplier into the
model reveals why it should not be used to offset legal uncertainty.
The Article evaluates these findings from the perspective of a regulator
who recognizes that compliance is probabilistic, prefers more compliance to
less, but does not demand perfection. Even this loosely specified regulatory
objective is inconsistent with some common government enforcement
strategies in view of the model's results. Regulators should rethink their
reliance on the in terrorem effect of vague standards when the actions of
regulated parties are observable. Regulators should also be wary of leaving
uncertain laws on the books without either clarifying them or reiterating their
uncertainty.
Finally, the Article offers a path to a significant extension of the complete
deterrence framework that has long played a second fiddle to the dominant
optimal deterrence theory. The framework's distinctive feature is gain-based
sanctions-the same sanctions that are built into the present model. However,
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in contrast with the complete deterrence framework, the probabilistic
compliance approach extends the analysis of these sanctions to settings where
the law is uncertain, and where complete deterrence is not appropriate or
achievable. Granted, even with this extension, the probabilistic compliance
framework does not offer a strong normative justification of gain-based
sanctions. But understanding their incentive effects in the presence of legal
uncertainty should be quite useful to regulators grappling with the day-to-day
realities of enforcing countless existing laws, uncertain and imperfect as they
may be.
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